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The BoE, HMT, DMO decision to unwind quantatitive easing completely is NOT something to get worked up by, however tempting. 1) This was always the intention (see Mervyn King 2009) 2) It has tiny fiscal effects (nothing like George Osborne's 2012 gambit, which ONS stopped after my complaints).

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It is marginally bad for the current budget rule and marginally good for the debt rule. Marginally is the operative word here. 3) The BoE would not have chosen to back the currency with long-dated gilts on its books, but it's not a bad thing to do with them

4) Having DMO do sales to the market is also marginal. It always set the marturity structure of issuance after knowing the BoE sales, so was always in charge. This formallises the practice 5) There is a tiny benefit to the public purse from BoE not selling small quantities of illiquid bonds

Pace @chrisgiles.ft.com, maturity of BoE/APF gilt sales is a real issue. DMO knowing what gilts BoE/APF will sell doesn't put it 'in charge' of maturity profile. Comparing what they sold shows DMO didn't want to sell longest-dated gilts at all. It acquiesced to rather than welcomed APF sales.

6) Governments of any colour could still work with BoE on a tiered reserves scheme not to remunerate all reserves at Bank Rate if a future government wanted to (at least untile 2034). But BoE by continuing QT is reducing the interest rate risk it bears

7) UK gilt market likes it - but let's not get too excited by a 10bp move in the 30-year yield. That way madness lies 8) The pause in sales until April suggests that despite working on this for a year and despite many outsiders suggesting similar stuff, UK authorities can't take decisions quickly