Short piece w @andreaeyleen.bsky.social @irisvanrooij.bsky.social addressing errors on the role of scientific models related also to AI misuse seen everywhere not just psychology: On Models, Prediction, and Scientific Roles Thereof: Commentary on Sanbonmatsu et al. (2025) doi.org/10.5281/zeno... 1/
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I'm back! Our paper takes another that mischaracterises our views on models, but isn't alone, to highlight our view, which is that: > the scramble for so-called prediction that causes “theories in psychological science [to] be vague, weak, and lacking in parsimony” doi.org/10.5281/zeno... 3/
3️⃣ "cognitive capacities are the main target of theorising" > vision, categorisation, navigation, and so on, are not phenomena in a straightforward way. Capacities can be meaningfully detached from individual phenomena, if by phenomenon we mean observations, datasets, or psychological effects. 6/
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Another important aspect many confuse or forget is how we get rid of models, things like falsification etc. But: 4️⃣ "metatheoretical calculi in practice are messy" zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10...
Finally: 5️⃣ models are not (of the) data! > This confusion [of] map and territory, theory and observations, [is at the root of] damaging issues in contemporary theorising, especially when under the influence of the technology industry’s logic doi.org/10.5281/zeno...
I also want to say that I really appreciated the expression by @danmcquillan.bsky.social — we are indeed > witnessing due to AI, which is deeply historically and presently intertwined with psychology, the “severing of society from its previous moorings.” (McQuillan, 2026) doi.org/10.5281/zeno...
As well as @francesegan.bsky.social on how philosophy and our field see each other: > Frances Egan (2025) says: “I suspect, though, that cognitive scientists would be quite surprised to hear that their theorizing requires supplementation by philosophers” (p. 50). doi.org/10.5281/zeno...