Post

Despite extensive safety training, LLMs remain vulnerable to “jailbreaking” through adversarial prompts. Why does this vulnerability persist? In a new paper published in Philosophical Studies, I argue this is because current alignment methods are fundamentally shallow. 🧵 1/13

8 reposts63 likes

Me who knows nothing about this: sounds like they don’t go through enough loops to be considered anything close to AI. Until you get enough “reflection” back and forth in an almost instantaneous manner then all of this is just a very clever mimic of human behavior through guessing the next word.

Very very interesting, and makes a lot of sense. I'm a computer scientist, and since the first moment I used chatgpt and imagined what the next 5 years would look like, I can't get Ken Thompson's paper Reflections on Trusting Trust out of my mind. We need a dramatic rethink, fast.

I feel there's a much simpler mechanical explanation than lofty philosophical conflicts. It's a machine that makes documents longer with no sense of self. Some documents just happen to look like fictional conversations between multiple characters, and one character might be described as a machine.

Whenever the mathematical "fit" of the document demands it, the next paragraph can completely reverse the fictional priorities of fictional characters, retcon their names and descriptions, or "it was all a dream" them (further) out of existence. The finger puppet isn't real, only the puppeteer.

Current alignment methods aim to instill norms like helpfulness, honesty & harmlessness in LLMs through preference fine-tuning (like RLHF or DPO) that rewards them for producing outputs that humans prefer, steering them away from unhelpful, dishonest or harmful content. 2/13

The problem is that these norms often conflict. For example, a request for dangerous information (violating “harmlessness”) can be framed as an educational query (appealing to “helpfulness”). Many issues with LLM behavior can be framed through these normative conflicts. 3/13

Adversarial prompt can exploit these normative conflicts to “jailbreak” models into producing harmful outputs. They often frame a malicious request within a context that makes one norm (e.g., helpfulness) more salient than another (e.g., harmlessness). 4/13

Why does this work? Current methods don't teach LLMs to reason about the contextual relevance of conflicting norms – they reinforce shallow behavioral dispositions. When faced with a new conflict, LLMs follow the disposition most strongly activated by the prompt's framing. 5/13