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Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified a cluster of compromised websites leading to ClickFix attacks. Instead of downloading and executing remote payloads like the typical attack pattern, in this attack, the websites pre-fetch a script payload into the browser cache disguised as a PNG file.

When a user is later tricked into executing the malicious command, the cached website content is already on the device, loaded, and ready to be executed. This helps to hide the payload script and helps bypass the character limit of the Run dialog.

ClickFix attacks persuade users to execute attacker-supplied commands under the guise of verification or repair. In this specific campaign, a fake lure instructs users to open Windows Run, paste clipboard content and press Enter.

It compares each file’s byte length with an expected value. Rather than searching for a marker within the contents like previous attacks, it copies a size-matching cache entry to %LOCALAPPDATA%\Temp\t.vbs, giving the cached payload a VBScript extension, then executes it with wscript.exe.

Copy output and errors are suppressed. The expected size varies across variants. The VBScript collects host information through WMI, retrieves v.ps1 from cocojambo[.]us[.]com/alfa, and launches PowerShell without a profile and with execution-policy bypass.

A later PowerShell stage downloads the next-stage payload as cab.dat, then reads and executes its contents in a hidden window. The PowerShell stage triggers .NET compilation using csc.exe and cvtres.exe, then launches timeout.exe.