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Microsoft is tracking an active supply chain attack in which a threat actor compromised the trusted OAuth App of the backup application ConnectWise Cloud Backup (AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae), formerly SkyKick Backup, to obtain access tokens across customer tenants.

ConnectWise Cloud Backup is a multitenant application; customers grant consent for the application to operate in their tenants. We assess that the actor likely abused permissions previously granted by customers to the application, including highly elevated permissions like Directory.ReadWrite.All.

Follow-on activity included Microsoft Graph API reconnaissance and attempts to add additional credentials on the related service principal in target tenants to maintain direct access as a backdoor.

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Defenders should review service principal sign-ins from unrecognized IP addresses, app credential changes, and OAuth grant activity associated with this OAuth AppId. We recommend looking for Threat Intelligence alerts on matching of IP against the Graph API activity & service principal activities.

Indicators of compromise (IOCs): - App name: ConnectWise Cloud Backup - AppId: 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae - Publisher name: SkyKick - Source IP: 144.172.64[.]128 - User agents: Python-urllib/3.12, python-requests/2.31, python-requests/2.34.2

The credential-addition step has a preventive control: an app management policy can restrict passwordCredentials on applications and service principals, per the Graph docs. It does nothing about consent already granted - which is the way in here - but it closes that backdoor.