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11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

12/Fred 7 of the ruling explicitly addresses the question of constitutionality of an order explicitly based on ancestry as already being settled by the Hirabayashi case, deemed acceptable to prevent espionage and sabotage. 8 acknowledges the camps as worse, but acceptable by the same logic.

13/Fred Korematsu’s case is summarized as that by May of 1942, about six months after Pearl, it was clear that there would be no invasion of the US by Japan. What’s unsaid but implied here is that arbitrary and extreme measures were not justified if there was no obvious threat.

14/Fred Sections 10 and 11 form what look like an argument for a rational basis (i.e. the government didn’t have time to figure out who was loyal). This is not a criterion considered for “strict scrutiny” which should have been the level applied for an obvious infringement on protected rights.

15/Fred The court cites Chastleton Corp v Sinclair (and with it Block v Hirsh, the case before Chastleton on the same issue) to hold that while the current situation at the time of the ruling seems excessive, the court must consider the action in the context in which it happened.

16/Fred Chastleton also established that the declaration of emergency was something the court could review. The remainder of section 12 of the ruling is an acknowledgment of extreme hardship but also that extreme hardship is expected in wartime. Same basic logic could have justified any atrocity.

17/Fred Sections 13-15 of the ruling addresses the claim that Korematsu faced two conflicting orders - one prohibiting travel and one requiring exclusion. The court argues that there was no conflict as the first order said that it ended on further direction, which the exclusion provided.

18/Fred To the credit of SCOTUS they at least understood the task, which was to evaluate the constitutionality of the whole program, not just Korematsu’s specific situation. Section 16 splits the issue into three requirements: 1. Leave restricted area. 2. Report to officials. 3. Be sent to camps.

19/Fred Ex parte Endo, which was decided the same day, found that a loyal citizen cannot be held on suspicion of disloyalty. Section 17 of the Korematsu ruling argues a distinction between giving the order to detain on suspicion and the validity of continuing the order on absence of evidence.