2plus2equals.bsky.social

Toonen/1 juris.ohchr.org/casedetails/... Decision is here. I think the jumble at the top is covenant on civil and political rights (CCPR), communication (C), Session # (50), Decision (D), tracking number (488), year (1992). Toonen submitted the complaint in 1991, it was taken for review in 1992.

Toonen/6 Toonen’s complaint was Tasmanian law banning “…all forms of sexual contact between consenting adult homosexual men in private.” In addition to being illegal it also empowered the police to investigate him, even if not charged. I’m not finding if this did happen or if just a threat.

Toonen/1 juris.ohchr.org/casedetails/... Decision is here. I think the jumble at the top is covenant on civil and political rights (CCPR), communication (C), Session # (50), Decision (D), tracking number (488), year (1992). Toonen submitted the complaint in 1991, it was taken for review in 1992.

Toonen/4 Toonen is described as the author of the complaint, a citizen of Australia residing in Hobart, Tasmania. Tasmania is the smallest Australian state and one that leans more conservative (the Australian Liberal party). In 1990, it was a comfortable Liberal win.

Toonen/1 juris.ohchr.org/casedetails/... Decision is here. I think the jumble at the top is covenant on civil and political rights (CCPR), communication (C), Session # (50), Decision (D), tracking number (488), year (1992). Toonen submitted the complaint in 1991, it was taken for review in 1992.

Toonen/2 There are three articles mentioned as “substantive” in the complaint - 2-1 (access to legal remedies), 17-1 (right to privacy, explicitly including a right to the sexual activity of consenting adults), and 26, (equality under the law generally). 17-1 is the main issue at hand.

31/Fred The final dissent comes from Justice Jackson. Not the current one, obviously, but Robert H. Jackson, later noted for his work in the Nuremberg trials, and the last SCOTUS justice who did not go to law school, instead being apprenticed (“reading law”) like Kim Kardashian.

33/Fred Continuing with his dissent, Jackson addresses the reality of military orders as sensibly unrestrained by strict constitutionality so long as they do not persist past a clearly defined emergency. He argues that they are still unconstitutional and that endorsing that error creates problems.

31/Fred The final dissent comes from Justice Jackson. Not the current one, obviously, but Robert H. Jackson, later noted for his work in the Nuremberg trials, and the last SCOTUS justice who did not go to law school, instead being apprenticed (“reading law”) like Kim Kardashian.

21/Fred In section 20 the court flat out denies that it is ruling on the internment of a citizen based solely on ancestry - claimed as a “clear” ruling without actually specifying which ruling. It does say that because we were at war with Japan it was justified to act solely on ancestry.

29/Fred Murphy, LTC US Army (ret), further notes that there was no evidence to justify that those sent to the camps were disloyal. Even when many served in the 442nd the orders persisted, so Murphy’s point that it was always just about racism seems obvious. www.army.mil/article-amp/...

21/Fred In section 20 the court flat out denies that it is ruling on the internment of a citizen based solely on ancestry - claimed as a “clear” ruling without actually specifying which ruling. It does say that because we were at war with Japan it was justified to act solely on ancestry.

27/Fred Murphy cites the 1932 precedent of Sterling v Constantin that military necessity is subject to judicial review. As a sidebar, this case looks wild - Texas Governor Sterling declared martial law to control prices of oil. SCOTUS said “not allowed.” supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

21/Fred In section 20 the court flat out denies that it is ruling on the internment of a citizen based solely on ancestry - claimed as a “clear” ruling without actually specifying which ruling. It does say that because we were at war with Japan it was justified to act solely on ancestry.

25/Fred Roberts also disputed that Korematsu was not allowed to contest a dubiously constitutional law and was expected to comply and be imprisoned before being able to challenge it. Not clear what this addresses, presumably the court actions before certiorari was granted?

21/Fred In section 20 the court flat out denies that it is ruling on the internment of a citizen based solely on ancestry - claimed as a “clear” ruling without actually specifying which ruling. It does say that because we were at war with Japan it was justified to act solely on ancestry.

23/Fred Justice (Owen) Roberts wrote the first dissent, opening with that the “…facts exhibit a clear violation of constitutional rights.” It was a 6-3 decision, and each of the three dissenting wrote a separate dissent. Roberts goes into detail on the sequence of events for his argument.

21/Fred In section 20 the court flat out denies that it is ruling on the internment of a citizen based solely on ancestry - claimed as a “clear” ruling without actually specifying which ruling. It does say that because we were at war with Japan it was justified to act solely on ancestry.

11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

19/Fred Ex parte Endo, which was decided the same day, found that a loyal citizen cannot be held on suspicion of disloyalty. Section 17 of the Korematsu ruling argues a distinction between giving the order to detain on suspicion and the validity of continuing the order on absence of evidence.

11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

17/Fred Sections 13-15 of the ruling addresses the claim that Korematsu faced two conflicting orders - one prohibiting travel and one requiring exclusion. The court argues that there was no conflict as the first order said that it ended on further direction, which the exclusion provided.

11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

15/Fred The court cites Chastleton Corp v Sinclair (and with it Block v Hirsh, the case before Chastleton on the same issue) to hold that while the current situation at the time of the ruling seems excessive, the court must consider the action in the context in which it happened.

11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

13/Fred Korematsu’s case is summarized as that by May of 1942, about six months after Pearl, it was clear that there would be no invasion of the US by Japan. What’s unsaid but implied here is that arbitrary and extreme measures were not justified if there was no obvious threat.

11/Fred The ruling compares the case of Korematsu with the Hirabayashi ruling the previous year where court held that a curfew based solely on ancestry was justified when at war with the country of ancestry, though apparently only when it was Japan. supreme.justia.com/cases/federa...

1/Fred The oral arguments for Korematsu’s SCOTUS trial took place on October 11-12, 1944. In the context of the Pacific war this was island hopping, mid-Peleliu. In Europe this is 4 months after D-Day. Korematsu was convicted 8Sep1942, appealed and upheld 7Jan1944, granted certiorari 27Mar1944.

9/Fred Section 3 refers to the “instant case” (legal speak for the case currently before the court) being that there was information Korematsu violated a law passed by Congress, 18 U.S.C.A. §97(a), quoted in section 4. Can’t find this section now on a quick search, apparently repealed in 1948.

1/Fred The oral arguments for Korematsu’s SCOTUS trial took place on October 11-12, 1944. In the context of the Pacific war this was island hopping, mid-Peleliu. In Europe this is 4 months after D-Day. Korematsu was convicted 8Sep1942, appealed and upheld 7Jan1944, granted certiorari 27Mar1944.

7/Fred The sections of the ruling are numbered, and 1 is the charges. Korematsu was charged with being of Japanese descent and remaining in “military area #1” described in exclusion order 34, linked. The ruling notes that there is no question of his loyalty. www.javadc.org/java/docs/19...

1/Fred The oral arguments for Korematsu’s SCOTUS trial took place on October 11-12, 1944. In the context of the Pacific war this was island hopping, mid-Peleliu. In Europe this is 4 months after D-Day. Korematsu was convicted 8Sep1942, appealed and upheld 7Jan1944, granted certiorari 27Mar1944.

5/Fred Attorney for the government was Charles Fahy. He was later a judge but is known for cases on Order 9066 and the writ of coram nobis that followed because he suppressed evidence that would have undermined the claims he made in the case. encyclopedia.densho.org/Charles_Fahy/

1/Fred The oral arguments for Korematsu’s SCOTUS trial took place on October 11-12, 1944. In the context of the Pacific war this was island hopping, mid-Peleliu. In Europe this is 4 months after D-Day. Korematsu was convicted 8Sep1942, appealed and upheld 7Jan1944, granted certiorari 27Mar1944.

3/Fred Two attorneys are listed for the petitioner. The first is Wayne M. Collins, a WW1 USN veteran and head of the California ACLU. He had been practicing law for about 17 years at that point and had established that branch of the ACLU in 1934. en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wayne_M...

1/Fred The oral arguments for Korematsu’s SCOTUS trial took place on October 11-12, 1944. In the context of the Pacific war this was island hopping, mid-Peleliu. In Europe this is 4 months after D-Day. Korematsu was convicted 8Sep1942, appealed and upheld 7Jan1944, granted certiorari 27Mar1944.

62/What FD closes the speech with a poem by William Lloyd Garrison which references the command in Leviticus 25 for a “reset” year where all debt is forgiven, slaves released, etc… which, well, has not happened in a long time as described biblically. commongood.cc/reader/god-s...

61/What Well, that’s disconcerting. The site I’ve been reading from, the Frederick Douglass Papers project, is… unresponsive. Maybe just a temporary thing, but the virtual equivalent of book burning is very much in vogue at the moment and I would not be shocked to find the site is gone.