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We at TanStack just had a major attack against our Router packages. We have a postmortem out now explaining what happened and how we mitigated the response: tanstack.com/blog/npm-sup... No other TanStack packages outside of the Router monorepo were impacted

tanstack.comPostmortem: TanStack npm supply-chain compromise | TanStack BlogOn 2026-05-11, an attacker chained a pull_request_target Pwn Request, GitHub Actions cache poisoning across the fork↔base trust boundary, and OIDC token extraction from runner memory to publish 84 mal...

I'm leaving for JSHeroes tomorrow, but maybe that's an opportunity to kickstart it in-person. I know @tkdodo.eu is gonna be there. Maybe someone else too? Regardless, I need someone who'd like to work with me and has enough expertise in how the project is set up to be able to push back /

when I try to make it too strict. We need a good balance between security and DX, otherwise people will just throw security out.

Thanks, I meant immune 😁 With the right tools and configurations you can prevent all known install-time attack vectors. As a result, the malware would be forced to rely on people running the software from the package, which is much less common than simply having it in the dependency tree.

I appreciate the effort into avoiding security theater BTW, please do keep pointing these out when needed. This is the rare situation where I actually stand by my claim of immunity under specific circumstances.