We all know that the GDPR et al. aren't working great. Alas, the current proposals to fix that — in what EU jargon calls an "omnibus" — make it way worse. This counter-proposal is: better for people, simpler for businesses, *much* stronger on security, competition, sovereignty, and online safety. 🧵
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Before diving in, just for giggles, Ireland currently holds the rotating Presidency of the Council but their proposed compromise text is so spectacularly bad that their own AI Minister won't even admit to it being their proposal. mu.social/profile/toni...
Ireland's AI Minister refutes claims that the Irish presidency had a hand in drafting legislation that would scrap GDPR protections for AI products. #TonightVMTV
Businesses have a *data advantage* which they need to protect. Allowing their providers to access that data in limited, controlled ways helps, but definitely not donating it to as many others as possible — which the omnibus pushes for. I've written about this before: berjon.com/competition-....
SOLUTION: Remove the media exemption. Also tweak enough of the proposed ePrivacy terminal storage exemptions to make ad businesses possible (but not invasive) with the automated signal. I've long had a proposal for this: berjon.com/gpc-under-th...
PROBLEM: The omnibus doesn't actually simplify some things that could safely be simplified. GDPR compliance was part of my portfolio for 5 years at the @nytimes.com — and let me tell you: some parts of the GDPR are totally useless. They cost time and help no one. But those are still in?
PROBLEM: The omnibus massively worsens national security and online safety. A severe and largely ignored national security problem is ADINT (Advertising Intel). The pervasive surveillance developed for commercial purposes also has espionage (personal and corporate) and military applications.
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I cite a whole bunch of cases, but just to provide a few here… This includes Iran using it to target US troops in the current war: www.lawfaremedia.org/article/iran...
Seeing it used directly in conflict like this may seem new, but it's not as if it hadn't been reported on as a threat before: www.wired.com/story/phone-...
It's not as if the same EU officials who are working to facilitate ADINT haven't been targeted as well: netzpolitik.org/2025/databro...
And it's not as if the ADINT threat only comes from foreign adversaries — it's also dangerous when a far right government uses it for roundup raids: www.404media.co/email/0ba0f6...