Guy Berger

Guy Berger

@econberger.bsky.social

Senior Advisor on Labor Markets at Access/Macro; Workforce Economist in Residence at Guild; Senior Fellow at the Burning Glass Institute. I tweet a lot about labor markets, macro, and (sorry) music! Tweets represent my own views.

56.6K followers2.2K following6K posts

The September micro-boom in ADP weekly employment growth has partly faded. Employment growth in the 4 weeks to October 10th still stronger than it was in mid-summer

1/ We get the Q1 2026 business employment dynamics data next Wednesday. We talk a lot about the "frozen", low turnover market, as measured by JOLTS & similar data. BUT: turnover induced by establishment openings/closings is actually up relative to pre-pandemic.

2/ A corollary - turnover *within existing/surviving establishments* is actually lower than it was pre-pandemic, i.e. JOLTS understates how frozen the labor market is at these establishments

3/ Finally: while establishment-dynamic-driven employee turnover hasn't increased in every industry, in most of them it has been stronger than overall employee turnover.

On "the real white collar labor market disruption due to AI will happen after the next recession": 1/ I often see folks argue that a lot of latent/potential automation will kick in after the next recession. Companies will lay off workers during the downturn, then not rehire them.

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3/ To pick a specific example: the Great Recession decimated US manufacturing & construction employment. By the late 2010s, neither had fully recovered. But *the labor market did*, and was in better shape by 2019 than it had been in 2007.

4/ I don't think the long, slow recovery after 2009 was an inevitable outcome. We could have had that 2019 labor market sooner with better/easier fiscal policy. But the key thing is... demand creates jobs, albeit not necessarily the ones that existed before. /FIN

On "the real white collar labor market disruption due to AI will happen after the next recession": 1/ I often see folks argue that a lot of latent/potential automation will kick in after the next recession. Companies will lay off workers during the downturn, then not rehire them.

2/ There's history for this and I find it pretty plausible. But... there's an occasional further inference people make, which is that the aggregate labor market won't recover. And I think that inference is probably a mistake.

A useful 2ndary confirmation of the small/mild 2026 labor market recovery - fewer people are running out of unemployment insurance benefits

Guy Berger@econberger.bsky.social

4/ The claims exhaustion rate continues to slowly decline

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3/ I still think we're due for a decline in unemployment due to permanent layoff based on what happened last month, even if the decline in continuing claims has paused in October

I don’t think this is true, at all. If the Fed wants to lower inflation, it can do it in a pretty straightforwardly What *may* be true is various other policy choices (and possibly private sector developments) are making the short-term unemployment-inflation trade off worse

Here's a long-run view of the compression in pay across educational attainment. Premium for advanced degrees and penalty for not finishing HS are shrinking meaningfully; not much change to middle rungs (HS diploma all the way to 4 year bachelor's degree)

1/ We're seeing renewed pay growth compression among over-16 wage and salary workers... fastest wage growth at the 10th and 25th percentile, slowest wage at the 75th and 90th

2/ The picture is a little murkier once we restrict it to "25 and over" (younger workers are on average lower earning), but still the case that lower paid workers are experiencing faster wage growth than those at the 75th percentile

3/ Similar pattern when you look by educational attainment - slowest pay growth for people with advanced degrees, fastest pay growth for people who haven't completed high school

CPS-based turnover data recap: 1/ We can calculate JOLTS-like measures of turnover using the Current Population Survey. They show a mix of bad, meh, good developments: plunging quits looks bad; slight increase in layoffs; flat hiring; a tentative increase job-finding rates for the jobless

Indeed job postings update: 1/ Overall postings still up a little Y/Y, consistent with a small labor market recovery. Nothing more substantial than that.

2/ Software development job postings still growing at a very brisk past (>20% Y/Y) from a very deep deficit. At the current growth rate projected forward, we'll be back to pre-pandemic levels by early 2028.

3/ Another category that's growing rapidly: "human resources" (includes recruiting). We should be back to pre-pandemic levels by Thanksgiving or earlier

The unemployment rate index from Morning Consult is still quite low as of mid-October, which is shaping up as the best month for the labor market since May (as far as this indicator goes).

I’m revisiting A New World Record by ELO for the first time in ages and my appreciation and enjoyment of the craft is overcoming my cynicism

There are some reasonable 3rd order and occasional 2nd order quibbles with GDP It’s not the be all end all of economic welfare measurement But it’s quite useful and most arguments dismissive of it are very bad

The 17.1% forecast is almost certainly wrong ***by a lot***, but it’s excellent for intellectual accountability when people put these kinds of predictions out

Me to 5.5 yr old: Every parent hates slime. 5.5YO: Not EVERY parent. Me: Find me one parent that likes slime and I’ll give you a high-five. 5.5YO: Actually, I believe you. You’re right.

Must-read piece by @annielowrey.bsky.social … One of the biggest shortcomings of “due to AI, GDP growth will be <really big number> but there will be mass unemployment” predictions is that they’re conspicuously silent on what we’ll actually do with all this new-found abundance

1/ “Monetary policy can’t end every factor boosting inflation” - true 2/ “Monetary policy can’t lower inflation” - false I see a lot of people erroneously using 1 to imply 2

3/ Software development postings are also growing briskly, but from much further behind... at current rates we'll be back at pre-pandemic levels by early 2028

3/ Even if the decline in continuing claims really is on pause again, I think we still have catchup declines due in the parallel BLS series (unemployment due to permanent layoff)

A September dip in software developers as a share of the US labor force & employment after a steep ascent in 2026. Still a hair higher than a year ago. (This data is very noisy and not seasonally adjusted)