InterSecLab

InterSecLab's new investigation: "The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia's State-Mandated Messaging Application." Yes, Max is built to watch you. That part isn't news anymore. What our nine-week technical investigation reveals is how far its surveillance goes. interseclab.org/research/max

InterSecLab reposted

interseclab.orgМессенджер Max: анализ российского мессенджера, насаждаемого государствомVK может менять работу Max для каждого аккаунта отдельно. Что делает мессенджер, что может делать по команде и чего нам увидеть не удалось.

Two people can use the same version of Max on the same day, and it can behave very differently for each of them. VK decides, account by account. Our report is now available in Russian and Ukrainian. Читать на русском: interseclab.org/max-ru

A harvested address book, a detected VPN, a chat that was never private. None of this lands the same way for everyone. Here's what our findings on Max mean for the people most at risk. interseclab.org/research/max

For someone from a targeted minority, it means an address book that maps out an entire community, not just one account. For anyone with family abroad, it means the only line home is being watched.

interseclab.orgThe Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia’s State-Mandated Messaging ApplicationVK can change what the Russian Max messenger does to you, one user at a time. Its surveillance features can be switched on without you noticing. Read our full analysis.

These aren't edge cases. They're the people Max affects most, the ones with the least room to be wrong about what this app does. This report exists so they don't have to guess. Full report: interseclab.org/research/max

For a journalist, it means a source's name traveling through VK's servers the moment it's saved as a contact. For an opposition member, it means every message is readable by the same government they're speaking out against.

For millions of people in Russia and occupied Ukraine, Max isn't optional. It's the state-mandated messenger. For journalists, activists, minorities and anyone at risk, the choice is not between convenience and privacy. interseclab.org/research/max/

Our nine-week technical investigation found no end-to-end encryption, VPN detection, network probing, voice transcription, and address books uploaded in cleartext. Many of these capabilities can be switched on remotely by VK, for a single account, without the user ever knowing. #MaxApp

interseclab.orgHome | InterSecLabInterSecLab is a specialized digital security laboratory with advanced capabilities in digital forensics, research and threat intelligence.

Share this with anyone who uses Max, or works with people who do. Read the full report: The Max Messenger: An Analysis of Russia's State-Mandated Messaging Application. interseclab.org

InterSecLab reposted

anoni.net NEWS 新聞導讀

@news.anoni.net

InterSecLab’s technical analysis of Russia’s state messenger Max

anoni.netInterSecLab’s technical analysis of Russia’s state messenger MaxInterSecLab finds that Max, the messaging app Russia requires on new devices, has no end-to-end encryption. VPN detection, network probing and voice transcription can be switched per account from the server with nothing shown in the app. The mandate applies only to devices sold in Russia.

InterSecLab reposted

anoni.net NEWS 新聞導讀

@news.anoni.net

俄羅斯國家通訊 App Max 的技術分析 InterSecLab 分析俄羅斯規定預裝的通訊 App Max，發現它沒有端對端加密。VPN 偵測、網路探測與語音轉文字都能從伺服器針對個別帳號切換，介面上沒有任何提示。預裝規定只在俄羅斯實施。

anoni.net俄羅斯國家通訊 App Max 的技術分析InterSecLab 分析俄羅斯規定預裝的通訊 App Max，發現它沒有端對端加密。VPN 偵測、網路探測與語音轉文字都能從伺服器針對個別帳號切換，介面上沒有任何提示。預裝規定只在俄羅斯實施。

InterSecLab reposted

Steve Puluka

@spuluka.bsky.social

Interesting deep dive on the mandated Russian messaging service Max from @interseclab.bsky.social This is what state mandated surveillance looks like. interseclab.org/research/max/

youtu.beMAX тебя слышит. Обзор эксклюзивного расследования и советы как обезопасить себяYouTube video by DOXA | ДОКСА

We shared our findings on Max, Russia's mandatory messenger, with @doxajournal.bsky.social ahead of publication. They added reporting on the Russian context and made an incredible video for the people who have to live with this app. In Russian, with English subtitles: youtu.be/zJtn19XuLo4

doxa.teamDOXA — медиа против войны, диктатуры и неравенстваDOXA — это медиа о войне, диктатуре и неравенстве. Мы создаём пространство, где можно обсуждать то, как мы могли бы изменить мир к лучшему вместе

@doxajournal.bsky.social began in 2018 covering state pressure on Russian students and is now one of Russia's largest independent outlets. Follow their work at doxa.team

InterSecLab reposted

VPNLab

@vpnlab.io

Researchers say VK can turn on Max surveillance for one account at a time InterSecLab spent nine weeks inside Max. It reports no end-to-end encryption, an address book uploaded in cleartext and VPN checks toggled per account. #russia #max #vk

vpnlab.ioResearchers say VK can turn on Max surveillance for one account at a timeInterSecLab spent nine weeks inside Max. It reports no end-to-end encryption, an address book uploaded in cleartext and VPN checks toggled per account.

InterSecLab reposted

Крым.Реалии - krymr.com [Unofficial]

@ru.krymr.com.web.brid.gy

ru.krymr.comЛаборатория InterSecLab нашла в российском мессенджере Max опции для слежки за пользователямиVK может удаленно включать отдельные функции мессенджера для конкретных аккаунтов

InterSecLab reposted

Meduza in English

@meduza.io

Russia’s Kremlin-backed Max messenger has broad surveillance capabilities that VK can secretly switch on or off for individual accounts, researchers found. meduza.io/en/feature/2...

meduza.ioRussia’s state-backed messaging app Max can secretly change how it surveils individual users, researchers at InterSecLab find — MeduzaThe Kremlin-backed Max messenger has broad capabilities for tracking users, but their configuration can vary from account to account and is controlled by its developer, the Russian social media…

For journalists, opposition members, lawyers, religious and ethnic minorities, queer Russians, anyone with family abroad, and Ukrainians under occupation, it is not abstract. For them, a messenger is a helpline, a livelihood, a community, and a way to reach the people who keep them alive.

The choice Max presents is not convenience against privacy. With no viable alternative communication platforms, the choice is to use a surveillance channel operated by a hostile state or have no ability to communicate at all. Here's everything we could find: interseclab.org/research/max

Some of our findings: • No end-to-end encryption at all • VPN detection that blocks message sending • Network probing • Voice transcription using a server-supplied keyword model • Real-time presence tracking for non-contacts • Address book uploaded in cleartext, names paired with numbers

What Max does today is not what Max is. Network probing, VPN detection, voice transcription and elevated logging sit behind feature flags VK can switch on remotely, for a single account, in real time. That person can be placed under closer surveillance without ever knowing it.

European Centre for Press and Media Freedom

14 Sept

We've expanded to LinkedIn. If that's where you follow security research and digital rights work, come find us there. Same investigations, one more place to connect. www.linkedin.com/company/inte...

InterSecLab reposted

@ecpmf.bsky.social

Replying to @ecpmf.bsky.social

China´s Censorship technology goes global. “The Great Firewall Export” examines the global export of China's Great Firewall and who enables it: interseclab.org/research/the... @interseclab.bsky.social @amnesty.org @justiceformyanmar.org @ftm.eu @theglobeandmail.com

We are honored to be shortlisted for the IJ4EU Impact Awards 2026 | @ecpmf.bsky.social, for The Great Firewall Export: China's Censorship Technology Goes Global. A cross-border investigation by eight organizations. What we found, in a thread. 🧵 #IJ4EUImpactAward

investigativejournalismforeu.netTen investigations shortlisted for IJ4EU Impact Awards 2026 - IJ4EUTen outstanding investigations have been shortlisted for the 2026 IJ4EU Impact Awards, celebrating collaborative journalism that drives real change across borders in Europe.

Thank you to IJ4EU and our partners: Amnesty International, Justice for Myanmar, Paper Trail Media, The Globe and Mail, the Tor Project, Der Standard and Follow the Money. @amnesty.org @justiceformyanmar.org @papertrailmedia.de @ftm.eu @theglobeandmail.com @torproject.org @derstandard.at

interseclab.orgThe Internet Coup: A Technical Analysis on How a Chinese Company is Exporting The Great Firewall to Autocratic Regimes | InterSecLabThis research reveals groundbreaking findings on how Geedge Networks is selling an extensive suite of next-generation digital repression tools to client governments around the world.

Read The Internet Coup: interseclab.org/research/the...

Already running in Kazakhstan, Ethiopia, Pakistan and Myanmar. Internal job postings point to Malaysia, Bahrain, Algeria and India next. Where these systems run, a trusted VPN no longer guarantees safety.

This took a coalition. InterSecLab built the secure research infrastructure that turned a 600GB leak into a searchable dataset for every partner, then ran the forensic analysis of how the system works.

China's censorship model is now a product. Geedge Networks, founded by Fang Binxing, known as the father of China's Great Firewall, is selling it ready-made to governments abroad.

interseclab.orgMADLink: A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain | InterSecLabNew findings expose a Taiwanese vestige in Geedge Networks' supply chain: 1,708 ADLINK units enabling state-level surveillance systems exported to authoritarian governments.

The system watches a whole country's internet: deep packet inspection, VPN blocking, real-time user tracking and mobile interception. All maintained and run from China.

InterSecLab reposted

Jurre van Bergen

@jurrevanbergen.nl

25 Apr

@interseclab.bsky.social published new research and looking at the supply chain based on the Geedge Networks leak. MADLink - A Taiwanese Vestige in the Geedge Supply Chain. interseclab.org/research/mad...

InterSecLab reposted

Open Technology Fund

@opentechfund.bsky.social

13 Nov 2025

New @economist.com article cites @interseclab.bsky.social 's @opentechfund.bsky.social-supported research into how Chinese firm Geedge Networks exports internet-control technology. www.economist.com/internationa...

economist.comChina’s creepiest export surgeCountries are queuing to buy the tools and techniques of the CCP’s security state

anoni.net網路政變 / The Internet Coup | InterSecLab - 匿名網路社群 Anoni.net/Docs關於中國網路防火牆服務輸出到其他國家，希望引起各界對網路自由和網路治理的反思和警覺

Readers in Chinese-speaking regions can now gain deeper insights into our findings on Geedge's suite! Our report “The Internet Coup” is now available in Traditional Chinese (using Taiwanese terminology), thanks to the translation by @anoni.net. #GreatFirewallExport anoni.net/docs/report/...

anoni.netAbout Us - Anonymity Network Community, Anoni.net/DocsPromotion and Translation of Anonymous Network Tools: Tor, Tails, and OONI in Taiwan.

Anonymity Networks Community is a group, based in Taiwan, focused on "Anonymous Networks" and "Internet Freedom", aiming to raise public awareness about the importance of internet freedom through tools like Tor, Tails, and OONI. Learn more: anoni.net/docs/en/about/

The translation, other #GreatFirewallExport reports, interviews, and other updates are available on interseclab.org/research/the...

Their goal with this translation is to ensure this critical information is widely understood and discussed across diverse cultural and linguistic contexts, fostering greater dialogue and collaboration in collectively addressing the challenges of the digital age.

pbs.orgMassive leak exposes how China’s ‘Great Firewall’ is being exported to other countriesFor years, China’s government has used what’s known as the “Great Firewall” to censor the internet inside its country and block access to select foreign websites. Now, a document leak shows that a lit...

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to the Anonymity Networks Community @anoni.net for their support to spreading our report further and help communities to understand the implications of these findings.

InterSecLab reposted

Jurre van Bergen

@jurrevanbergen.nl

23 Oct 2025

PBS did a great section on the Great Firewall Export, that we published together with @papertrailmedia.de @interseclab.bsky.social @justiceformyanmar.org @theglobeandmail.com @torproject.bsky.social and us @amnesty.org. www.pbs.org/newshour/sho...

interseclab.orgCan mass surveillance be a consumer product? | InterSecLabSurveillance company leaks expose mass surveillance, state control, and private sector involvement. What does this mean for global privacy?

Mass surveillance has become a consumer product. Our new blog post explores what 100,000+ leaked documents reveal about a new frontier in state control — and what it means for protecting privacy and digital security. Read more: interseclab.org/can-mass-sur... #GreatFirewallExport

What makes this leak significant is the technical detail showing how these systems track users across platforms, adapt to defeat Tor, and enable retroactive identification of activities that were legal at the time.

Our post reveals what this shift means: when repression becomes a service that can be bought, civil liberties now depend on what states can afford to purchase. Read more: interseclab.org/can-mass-sur... #GreatFirewallExport

Geedge Networks, founded by the architect of China's censorship system, is commercializing surveillance as a managed service — complete with maintenance, upgrades, and custom blocking rules.

This connects to stories many outlets have covered: Myanmar's post-coup crackdown, new laws criminalizing VPNs, and the global surveillance market that emerged as Western export restrictions tightened.