L. Mao Hubbard

1 Jan

I'll be filling this space every year with a non-fiction book that I'll be reading "out loud" because otherwise my lazy, undisciplined reading habits would let the book move back to the shelf unread. For 2026, I'm reading 𝘈 𝘗𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦'𝘴 𝘏𝘪𝘴𝘵𝘰𝘳𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘜𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 by Howard Zinn.

10h

Huntington saw the possible end of that quarter century when "the United States was the hegemonic power in a system of world order." His conclusion was that there had developed "an excess of democracy," and he suggested "desirable limits to the extension of political democracy."

Huntington was troubled by what he saw: “The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960's was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private.

“To the extent that the United States was governed by anyone during the decades after World War II, it was governed by the President acting with the support and cooperation of key individuals and groups in the executive office, the federal bureaucracy, Congress,

“and the more important businesses, banks, law firms, foundations, and media, which constitute the private sector's ‘Establishment.’” This was probably the frankest statement ever made by an Establishment adviser.

Huntington was troubled by what he saw: “The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960's was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private.

“People no longer felt the same obligation to obey those whom they had previously considered superior to themselves in age, rank, status, expertise, character, or talents.” All this, he said, "produced problems for the governability of democracy in the 1970's...."

Critical in all this was the decline in the authority of the President. And:

Huntington was troubled by what he saw: “The essence of the democratic surge of the 1960's was a general challenge to existing systems of authority, public and private.

“In one form or another, this challenge manifested itself in the family, the university, business, public and private associations, politics, the governmental bureaucracy, and the military services.

June 14, 1975, was Flag Day, and President Gerald Ford spoke at Fort Benning, Georgia, where the army staged a march symbolizing its involvement in thirteen wars. Ford commented that he was glad to see so many flags, but a reporter covering the event wrote:

That July the Lou Harris poll, looking at the public's confidence in the government from 1966 to 1975, reported that confidence in the military during that period had dropped from 62 percent to 29 percent, in business from 55 percent to 18 percent,

in both President and Congress from 42 percent to 13 percent. Shortly after that, another Harris poll reported "65% of Americans oppose military aid abroad because they feel it allows dictatorships to maintain control over their population."

"Actually, there were few American flags to be seen near the President's reviewing stand. One, held aloft by demonstrators, bore an inked-in inscription saying, 'No more genocide in our name.' It was torn down by spectators as their neighbors applauded."

It was also learned from the investigation that the CIA—with the collusion of a secret Committee of Forty headed by Henry Kissinger— had worked to "destabilize" the Chilean government headed by Salvadore Allende,

a Marxist who had been elected president in one of the rare free elections in Latin America. ITT, with large interests in Cuba, played a part in this operation.

When in 1974 the American ambassador to Chile, David Popper, suggested to the Chilean junta (which, with U.S. aid, had overthrown Allende) that they were violating human rights, he was rebuked by Kissinger, who sent word: "Tell Popper to cut out the political science lectures."

Columnist James Reston wrote: "In fact, the Administration almost seems grateful for the opportunity to demonstrate that the President can act quickly.... Officials here have been bridling over a host of silly taunts about the American 'paper tiger' and hope the Marines have answered the charge."

But why would the prestigious 𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘦𝘴 columnist James Reston, a strong critic of Nixon and Watergate, call the 𝘔𝘢𝘺𝘢𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘻 operation "melodramatic and successful"? And why would the 𝘕𝘦𝘸 𝘠𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘦𝘴, which had criticized the Vietnam war, talk about the "admirable efficiency" of the operation?

What seemed to be happening was that the Establishment—Republicans, Democrats, newspapers, television—was closing ranks behind Ford and Kissinger, and behind the idea that American authority must be asserted everywhere in the world.

It was not surprising that Secretary of Defense Schlesinger called it a "very successful operation," done "for purposes that were necessary for the well-being of this society.”

No American soldier was hurt by the Cambodians. The marines invading Tang Island, however, met unexpectedly tough resistance, and of two hundred invaders, one-third were soon dead or wounded (this exceeded the casualty rate in the World War II invasion of Iwo Jima).

Why, even after the ship and crew were recovered, did Ford order American planes to bomb the Cambodian mainland, with untold Cambodian casualties? What could justify such a combination of moral blindness and military bungling?

The answer to this came soon: It was necessary to show the world that giant America, defeated by tiny Vietnam, was still powerful and resolute.

Five of eleven helicopters in the invasion force were blown up or disabled. Also, twenty-three Americans were killed in a helicopter crash over Thailand on their way to participate in the action, a fact the government tried to keep secret.

All together, forty-one Americans were killed in the military actions ordered by Ford. There were thirty-nine sailors on the 𝘔𝘢𝘺𝘢𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘻. Why the rush to bomb, strafe, attack?

It was a few months after these reports, in April of 1975, that Secretary of State Kissinger, invited to be commencement speaker at the University of Michigan, was faced with petitions protesting the invitation, because of Kissinger's role in the Vietnam war.

Kissinger was quoted that April (by 𝘞𝘢𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘵𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘴𝘵 columnist Tom Braden): "The U.S. must carry out some act somewhere in the world which shows its determination to continue to be a world power.”

The following month came the 𝘔𝘢𝘺𝘢𝘨𝘶𝘦𝘻 affair.

Also a counter-commencement program was planned. He withdrew. It was a low time for the administration. Vietnam was "lost" (the very word supposed it was ours to lose).

In 1971 ITT planned to take over the $1.5 billion Hartford Fire Insurance Company—the largest merger in corporate history. The antitrust division of the Justice Department moved to prosecute ITT for violating the antitrust laws.

However, the prosecution did not take place and ITT was allowed to merge with Hartford. It was all settled out of court, in a secret arrangement in which ITT agreed to donate $400,000 to the Republican party. It seemed that Richard Kleindienst, deputy Attorney General,

had six meetings with an ITT director named Felix Rohatyn, and then brought in the head of the antitrust division, Richard McLaren, who was persuaded by Rohatyn that to stop the merger would cause a "hardship" for ITT stockholders. McLaren agreed. He was later appointed a federal judge.

The televised Senate Committee hearings on Watergate stopped suddenly before the subject of corporate connections was reached.

were given the most fleeting attention. Dirty tricks against the Socialist Workers party, the Black Panthers, other radical groups, had to be searched for in a few newspapers.

The whole nation heard the details of the quick break-in at the Watergate apartment; there was never a similar television hearing on the long-term break-in in Vietnam.

The televised Senate Committee hearings on Watergate stopped suddenly before the subject of corporate connections was reached.

It was typical of the selective coverage of important events by the television industry: bizarre shenanigans like the Watergate burglary were given full treatment, while instances of ongoing practice—the My Lai massacre, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the work of the FBI and CIA—

No respectable American newspaper said what was said by Claude Julien, editor of the 𝘔𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘦 𝘋𝘪𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘮𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘲𝘶𝘦 in September 1974. "The elimination of Mr. Richard Nixon leaves intact all the mechanisms and all the false values which permitted the Watergate scandal.”

Julien noted that Nixon's Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, would remain at his post—in other words, that Nixon's foreign policy would continue.

"That is to say," Julien wrote, "that Washington will continue to support General Pinochet in Chile, General Geisel in Brazil, General Stroessner in Paraguay, etc….”

Six months before Nixon resigned, the business magazine 𝘋𝘶𝘯'𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 reported a poll of three hundred corporation executives.

"The system is working," said a long-time strong critic of the Vietnam war, 𝘕𝘦𝘸 𝘠𝘰𝘳𝘬 𝘛𝘪𝘮𝘦𝘴 columnist Anthony Lewis.

The two journalists who had much to do with investigating and exposing Nixon, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward of the 𝘞𝘢𝘴𝘩𝘪𝘯𝘨𝘵𝘰𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘴𝘵, wrote that with Nixon's departure, there might be "restoration." All of this was in a mood of relief, of gratitude.

Six months before Nixon resigned, the business magazine 𝘋𝘶𝘯'𝘴 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 reported a poll of three hundred corporation executives.

Almost all had voted for Nixon in 1972, but now a majority said he should resign. "Right now, 90% of Wall Street would cheer if Nixon resigns," said a vice- president of Merrill Lynch Government Securities. When he did, there was relief in all sectors of the Establishment.

Gerald Ford, taking Nixon's office, said: "Our long national nightmare is over." Newspapers, whether they had been for or against Nixon, liberal or conservative, celebrated the successful, peaceful culmination of the Watergate crisis.

What followed the next year, after a grand jury in September indicted the Watergate burglars—plus Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy—was that, one after another, lesser officials of the Nixon administration, fearing prosecution, began to talk.

They gave information in judicial proceedings, to a Senate investigating committee, to the press. They implicated not only John Mitchell, but Robert Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Nixon's highest White House aides,

and finally Richard Nixon himself—in not only the Watergate burglaries, but a whole series of illegal actions against political opponents and antiwar activists. Nixon and his aides lied again and again as they tried to cover up their involvement.

The Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan had been posing the question: "Is the government run by a few big interests looking out for themselves?" The answer in 1964 had been "yes" from 26 percent of those polled; by 1972 the answer was "yes" from 53 percent of those polled.

An article in the 𝘈𝘮𝘦𝘳𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘯 𝘗𝘰𝘭𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘢𝘭 𝘚𝘤𝘪𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸 by Arthur H. Miller, reporting on the extensive polling done by the Survey Research Center, said that the polls showed "widespread, basic discontent and political alienation.”

He added (political scientists often took on the worries of the Establishment): "What is startling and somewhat alarming is the rapid degree of change in this basic attitude over a period of only six years."