tuckner

tuckner

@johntuckner.me

Working on finding bad software extensions.

810 followers294 following459 posts

Excited to secure the developer endpoint right as everyone is becoming a developer

Feross@feross.bsky.social

Today is a big day for @socket.dev. We raised a $60M Series C at a $1B valuation, led by Thrive Capital. 20,000+ orgs, 1.5M repos protected, 1,000+ supply chain attacks blocked per week. 3/5 FAANG companies are customers. We're just getting started.

A Chrome extension with 7,000 users and a Google Featured badge was recently sold, weaponized, and pushed a malicious update to that executed code through a hidden pixel. Here's how it worked 👇

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The original extension still works perfectly. Google Lens integration, screen capture, all of it. Users would never notice anything beyond a single permission acceptance prompt. That's what makes extension supply chain attacks so dangerous.

We tracked this one from the moment it was listed for sale Oct 11th, through the ownership change, to the malicious update Feb 17th. Full technical breakdown of the pixel trick, the C2 infrastructure, and the CSP stripping. annex.security/blog/pixel-p...

annex.securityPixel Perfect: Sold Extension Injects Code Through PixelA Google Lens extension that was sold gets weaponized overnight—stripping browser security headers and using a 1x1 GIF onload trick to execute C2-delivered JavaScript on every page

A Chrome extension with 7,000 users and a Google Featured badge was recently sold, weaponized, and pushed a malicious update to that executed code through a hidden pixel. Here's how it worked 👇

The new owner added a C2 server, stripped important security headers from all pages, and used a 1x1 invisible pixel's onload handler to execute remote JavaScript in pages. The actual malicious code never appears in the extension's source files, but the code update was worrying

LimaCharlie released their Agentic SecOps Workspace recently which runs Claude Code in their UI including MCP servers. It's never been so easy to just say 'look at my detections and research the extensions'. Even though 1Password falls under an unapproved policy, at least it isn't malicious!

As predicted - "oorzc" a developer with extensions totalling 25,000 legitimate installs across 4 extensions looks to have had their Open VSX account compromised and published malicious updates. The worst part is this...

tuckner@johntuckner.me

The next supply chain worm has been seeded in Open VSX. A cloned Angular extension with 5000 downloads has been available for two weeks and was updated with malware 6 days ago. This multi stage attack uses etherhiding, gcal c2, rust implants, and more. annex.security/blog/worms-l...

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What a mess and this isn't the first time this has happened! oorzc.mind-map@1.0.61 oorzc.i18n-tools-plus@1.6.8 oorzc.ssh-tools@0.5.1 (removed) oorzc.scss-to-css-compile@1.3.4 It is these incremental compromises that will become a widespread incident.

As predicted - "oorzc" a developer with extensions totalling 25,000 legitimate installs across 4 extensions looks to have had their Open VSX account compromised and published malicious updates. The worst part is this...

tuckner@johntuckner.me

The next supply chain worm has been seeded in Open VSX. A cloned Angular extension with 5000 downloads has been available for two weeks and was updated with malware 6 days ago. This multi stage attack uses etherhiding, gcal c2, rust implants, and more. annex.security/blog/worms-l...

1. Your extension will auto update 2. The malicious versions will be removed from Open VSX so no trace 3. Your extension will not downgrade itself 4. Victims will have to wait until the real developer publishes a new version to update 5. If the extensions are removed, they won't uninstall

If you've had to listen to me over the last couple months, it's likely you would've hear me say that all of our most important apps will have extensions or plugins for integration. Think we're learning from past mistakes?

A browser extension, PasteReady, was listed for sale last May became malicious after an ownership transfer on December 27th. Many organizations have been impacted by extensions which changed hands. @secureannex.com watches for transfers and warns you in advance! www.linkedin.com/pulse/paster...

linkedin.comPasteReady: Danger of sold extensionsThe PasteReady browser extension (dcbikjphkkgmgmjoohmbnhccbndgpmin) was sold and the new owner pushed malware immediately after taking ownership. PasteReady was put up for sale on http://extensionhub.

Pyrefly - Python Language Tooling by Meta is the 4th most used extension in Open VSX. Be careful downloading the 'Pro' version in Cursor hoping you'll get some extra features, it is published by 'casendsabotnu954' who just joined GitHub the other day. Textbook cloning and staging behavior!

Loving a new detection that identifies code extensions published by new and lightly used GitHub accounts.This time it instantly caught an extension impersonating JFrog which already has over 10k downloads.

Not the "pulling a Rabbit out of a hat" magic trick that most want. This Firefox extension completely changes from a "Simple Label Editor" to a Rabby wallet stealer overnight.

These code comments are an improvement from: 1. Request malware 2. Download malware 3. Make malware executable 4. Run malware This is the extent of the extension available in the VS Marketplace. Installs a Mythic agent from the C2.

Monitoring a large influx of AI slop extensions that are reposting a marginally refactored but known malicious package. The marketplace listings are packed with emojis and a couple sections of 'features'. This one made the mistake of linking to an already known piece of malware.

Welcome to Antigravity the newest most advanced agentic AI development tool by Google... ... uses Open VSX for extensions and shows malicious listings to users.

Changing how an extension looks in a marketplace doesn't require new code to be pushed. Check out the magic when this "Test Extension" magically turns into a "solidity" extension after being published. Review the full lineage of a marketplace listing using the new date picker in Secure Annex.

Vibed coded malicious extensions are getting out of hand! This 'theme' downloads a malicious zip, unpacks it, and runs it silently with PowerShell.

16 Firefox extensions with the almost the same name, same permhash requesting the most sensitive permission combinations like <all_urls> and cookies. Something being staged?

Malware in Open VSX and available in Cursor right now tailwind-nuxt.tailwindcss-for-react flutcode.flutter-extension yamlcode.yaml-vscode-extension

Resembles Glassworm signatures loading a rust binary. Some of the activation code is tucked into copied extensions, but still runs on activate.

Unprecedented code extension attacks this week. All are name squatting on popular tools. Only a couple have had malware deployed, many are still staging, few have been removed from marketplaces. There may be more coming. VS Marketplace: iconkieftwo.icon-theme-materiall 1/3

prisma-inc.prisma-studio-assistance prettier-vsc.vsce-prettier flutcode.flutter-extension csvmech.csvrainbow codevsce.codelddb-vscode saoudrizvsce.claude-devsce clangdcode.clangd-vsce cweijamysq.sync-settings-vscode bphpburnsus.iconesvscode klustfix.kluster-code-verify 2/3

vims-vsce.vscode-vim yamlcode.yaml-vscode-extension solblanco.svetle-vsce Open VSX: saoudrizvsce.claude-dev saoudrizvsce.claude-devsce vitalik.solidity 3/3

Imagine how useful it would be if the Chrome Web Store showed you users over time. This ad blocker went from 0 to 40,000 users overnight! 🤔

Going to have to reread Hacking: The Art of Exploitation, 2nd Edition by Jon Erickson in order to keep up with the advanced tactics we're starting to see in VS Code extension malware.

The extension was approved, now what? Are you going back tomorrow to see if it changed? You know they auto update instantly right? Rolling out to Secure Annex - code change alerts. This compares past code with additional context to understand how an extension is changing over time. Catch bad quick!

A brand new unlisted extension with 100,000 users? 41 ratings? Must be really valuable. Nope - completely manipulated stats and it doesn't even contain real code. It exists only to collect your searches and earn Bing Rewards.

We've found code extensions openly call themselves malware in the VS Code marketplace recently and now browser extensions posing as known malicious remote access tools to the Chrome Web Store. What gives?

Did you know you can manage an allowlist of MCP extensions and MCP servers (yes they're different) used by Claude desktop? If you're a Claude Enterprise customer you can configure these settings centrally and roll them out. This is separate from Claude Code though. Are you using this feature?

Powerful new Detections are added to Secure Annex. These are already catching subtle exploits like unicode extension names that evade other filters, manipulated download counts, and combinations of suspicious signatures in code.

Ridiculously cool that Tines is able to connect to MCP servers now. Understand entirely what any of the browser or code extensions you use might actually be doing. Orchestrate your extension review process or check if "Hello Kitty - You Glow Girl Cute Live Wallpaper" is more than what it says.

tuckner reposted

Replying to @campuscodi.risky.biz

-Couple loses fortune to scammers -Valid accounts still rule the day for initial access -Open VSX rotate leaked creds -ZeroAccess botnet dev is now a software dev -BadCandy flourishes in Australia -New Katreus miner -Malware reports on Aura Stealer, SectopRAT, SleepyDuck RAT, OysterLoader