Jimmy Wylie

Jimmy Wylie

@mayahustle.com

I look for ICS threats, and spend a lot of time reverse engineering. Distinguished Malware Analyst @ Dragos. Lead Analyst on TRISIS and PIPEDREAM. He/Him

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Howdy folks! I'm a malware analyst focused on critical infrastructure threats and ICS/OT malware. Aside from studying reverse engineering, I lift weights, play a lot of board games and try to keep my philosopher dog, Velma, entertained. Here's an example of my work: www.dragos.com/blog/analyzi...

There's been so much hype and exaggeration about what LLM technology does for malware developers. So, we've spent the past year looking at LLM-generated ICS malware to understand the reality, and we're excited to share the result at DISC. Register here: events.dragos.com/disc2026/120...

Jimmy Wylie reposted

We are pleased to release tmp.0ut 5 Volume! Get your viruses, rootkits, strange ELFs, weird machines, tiny files, cool art, and phresh beats here!! tmpout.sh/5/

I used to spend hours finding wrong answers to Linux issues on Reddit before giving up and figuring it out myself. Now, an LLM gives me the wrong answers instantly, boils the ocean, and forces me to manually solve the problem sooner. I feel so productive!

“The AI wrote it, so it must be good” is a trap, and a poor excuse to ignore a human edit. At the very least: - Rewrite the headings - Remove useless adverbs (AI loves “actually”) - Check that the flow of ideas is coherent. - Check for accuracy. (1/2)

- Ask yourself “Does this sound like me?” (Or whatever voice is required) Otherwise, your writing will sound the same as all the other copy-pasted AI slop, and you risk having your work ignored. (2/2)

Quoted in Dark Reading on the latest LotusWiper release by Kaspersky. I'm always glad when our team's expertise can reach a wide audience. We've seen an uptick in Wiper use since 2022, which makes sense. They're cheap to develop and effective at turning access into damage.

darkreading.comLotus Wiper Attack Targets Venezuelan Energy Firms, UtilitiesAn analysis of the destructive malware reveals extensive living-off-the-land (LotL) techniques and detailed strategies for the widespread data deletion.

ZionSiphon is an AI-generated, non-functional attempt at ICS malware. Malicious intent doesn't imply ability, and broken malware like this is a distraction when we have proven threats like VOLTZITE/Volt Typhoon out there hitting water utilities.: www.dragos.com/blog/zionsip...

dragos.comZionSiphon: Why This Malware Isn't A Credible ICS ThreatDragos analyzed ZionSiphon and assessed it as non-functional OT malware. Here's why it poses no credible threat to dam desalination or critical infrastructure

Ironically, S4 dropped my talk on vibe coding ICS malware on the same day that non-functional AI-slop OT "malware" is making headlines. It’s hype “malware” distracting us from real threats. More to say, but it's Friday :) In the meantime, I hope you enjoy the talk.

youtube.comBuilding FrostyGoop With The Help Of AIHow easy or hard is it for an attacker to build an OT attack platform such as FrostyGoop? Jimmy Wylie answered this question by developing, with the help of AI, a FrostyGoop attack platform. There were two caveats to this effort: 1. He built this from scratch without reusing any of the FrostyGoop

This blog nails some real problems with bringing AI into an organization in any industry, not just cybersecurity. The article brings up a human training issue that I've been pondering a lot. What does it look like to train a new reverse engineer with AI tools available?

sentinelone.comThe Implementation Blind Spot | Why Organizations Are Confusing Temporary Friction with Permanent SafetyOur new blog post explores the ‘cognitive rust belt’ — how AI friction masks skill loss and why organizations must act now.

"Claude hacks government" is as silly as saying "Metasploit hacked a hospital!" Blaming AI shifts responsibility away from the humans who orchestrate it, and confuses defenders into thinking they're up against some vague AI supervillain. AI hasn't changed the fundamental problem. 1/2

Capable attackers are still the threat, not the AI. The defenses we've been preaching for years still work. Stop worrying about AI. Instead, change your default passwords and enable MFA. 2/2

If you're trying to run Remnux on KVM by loading the OVA: For network access: KVM changes the network adapter name, so change the config in /etc/netplan, replacing the old adapter (like enss0) with the new one and reboot. Use networkctl to find the non-loopback adapter name (like en1ps0) 1/3

Remnux docs say to run "remnux install" after loading into KVM to install spice and other tools. When I do that, the VM gets worse: cursor disappears, resolution gets jacked. Instead, simply installing spice-vdagent using apt gets you dynamic resolution and copy-paste, and a nicer to use VM. 2/3

Afterwards, if you try to use remnux install, it will again break the vm tools inside the VM. I'm unsure the cause. I'm avoiding it for now. 3/3

I've spent a lot of time reversing ICS malware. Recently, I've been building it with AI tools. While there's been plenty of commentary and news about AI and malware, I'm excited to share what I learned actually trying to build some at S4x26. Stage 2, Feb 24, 12pm.

I know I'm feeling stressed out when I go back to reading Thich Nhat Hahn. His teachings calm me, and I need that reminder that happiness is available in any moment despite circumstance. I'm not even Buddhist. or maybe I am? He'd probably say the distinction isn't important.

This is the first known attack on DERs. Attackers compromised RTUs at 30 different sites. The report has an overview, defensive guidance, and a comparison to past ELECTRUM ops. Hats off to CERT Polska for leading the charge, and kudos to our Intel team for the hard work.

hubs.laIntel Report | ELECTRUM: Cyber Attack on Poland's Electric System 2025 | DragosA 2025 cyber attack on Poland’s electric system highlights both risk and resilience in modern power grids. Download the report →

I spent a couple months arguing with Claude and Copilot while building FrostyGoop variants for DNP3 (and Modbus), keeping detailed notes on what worked and what didn't. At S4, I’ll share my honest assessment of these tools and how they might lower barriers to ICS malware dev. See you in Miami!

A lot of folks have reached out about Socket’s recent report on a supply chain attack using malicious NuGet packages to target Siemens S7 protocol and other PLCs. This is not a supply chain attack in the traditional sense. 1/6

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The evidence also doesn't rule out security research as an explanation. I’d give this a low confidence assessment for malicious intent. That said, it's normal for analysts to reach different conclusions, and this isn't a criticism of Socket's solid technical analysis. 5/6

Props to their Threat Research team for identifying and publicizing these harmful packages. If you want to understand what the code does, check out their post. Bottom line: Always verify your dependencies and their sources! socket.dev/blog/9-ma... 6/6

socket.dev9 Malicious NuGet Packages Deliver Time-Delayed Destructive ...Socket researchers discovered nine malicious NuGet packages that use time-delayed payloads to crash applications and corrupt industrial control system...

A lot of folks have reached out about Socket’s recent report on a supply chain attack using malicious NuGet packages to target Siemens S7 protocol and other PLCs. This is not a supply chain attack in the traditional sense. 1/6

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While I agree the code is harmful and the packages are suspicious, I'm not convinced about the supply chain attack angle -- or if it is one, it’s not a particularly effective one. Several factors give me pause: 3/6

- The lure isn't convincing. - The packages are unpopular (even by Socket's metrics), so infection of new projects seems improbable. - Why would existing projects switch to the malicious dependencies? - There's no C2 code to confirm victims. How would an attacker know if this worked? 4/6

A lot of folks have reached out about Socket’s recent report on a supply chain attack using malicious NuGet packages to target Siemens S7 protocol and other PLCs. This is not a supply chain attack in the traditional sense. 1/6

No legitimate projects were compromised, and no S7, Sharp7, or Siemens codebases were modified. Socket identified packages published by a separate user ("shanhai666") containing code that probabilistically kills host processes and causes database write failures within specific date ranges. 2/6

Learning Modbus is basically this conversation: “I live at 502 Westport Ave.” “Sweet, I’m sending you a package.” “Wait! If you talk to the mail carrier, my address is 501 Westport Ave.” “Oh. So, you live at 501 Westport?” (1/2)

“No, that’s my neighbor, Bobby. I live at 502, but you have to write 501 on the package or the mail carrier brings it to the wrong house. He has a problem.” ICS is fun. This blog covers the problem: blog.softwaretoolbox.com/topserver-mo... (H/T to Reid Wightman for inspiring this post) (2/2)

blog.softwaretoolbox.comModbus Offset vs. Addressing: Why Does It Matter?Discover the relationship between the Modbus address used by TOP Server and the physical offset in a device when enabling/disabling Zero-Based Addressing.

I'm speaking at S4x26 on creating a FrostyGoop-style tool using AI. This experiment has been a good avenue for tackling a few questions I've had about AI-enabled software development. Most importantly, just how easy is it? I'm excited to share what I learn come February! 1/2

Other questions I'm exploring: How much does AI know about ICS protocols? Does AI truly lower the barrier for entry? If not, is that an AI limitation or am I just "holding it wrong"? Is it shortening my development time? Or solving some problems but creating new ones for a net-zero benefit? 2/2

I had a great experience at #FTSCon on Monday. Both the speakers and the audience are such high caliber that an interesting discussion can be had at any point during the day. The information presented is useful for folks in any technical aspect of cybersecurity, not just DFIR folks. 1/3

MacOS 26 really kills the T2 Intel Macs. It's technically compatible, but the experience is a drag, especially just after boot with all the indexing. I'm going to put a T2 Linux distro on this thing, and hope it improves the experience. I refuse to throw away a computer that's barely 5 years old.