netbiosX

netbiosX

@netbiosx.bsky.social

Purple Team

1.8K followers84 following358 posts

🚨 An AI attack for initial access, discovered by Forever Security recently: I tried to emulate the above scenario in the video: 1⃣ Malicious Markdown lands in Downloads 2⃣ Codex launched from the same directory 3⃣ Benign prompt submitted 4⃣ Hidden instructions processed 5⃣ calc.exe executed

🚨 Custom Extensions for SmartScreen Evasion 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒆𝒔 ✅️ Process Creation - Event ID 1 ✅️ Registry Key Creation of \Software\Classes - Event ID 12 ✅️ Registry Key Modification of \Software\Classes - Event ID 13 ✒️ ipurple.team/2026/10/22/c...

ipurple.teamCustom ExtensionsThreat actors may create a custom extension or modify an existing file extension to masquerade a malicious implant as a legitimate file. A custom file extension may be used to support phishing scen…

A new process injection technique has been disclosed to the public that places shellcode into a process via the SendMessageW API. 𝑺𝒐𝒎𝒆 𝒐𝒃𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔: ⚠️ Extremely noisy from a debugger/telemetry perspective ⚠️ ~32 KB implant size limitation ⚠️ Abnormal Parent-Child process relationships

Playing with the newest process‑injection technique in my lab to explore defensive detection opportunities: Console Named Pipe.

🎙️ The dump encoding library (𝑾𝒆𝒓𝑬𝒏𝒄.𝒅𝒍𝒍) enables threat actors to adopt the encryption used by Microsoft in their implant. Dropping a short video: 1️⃣ Encryption of payload (calc.bin) using the Microsoft 𝑾𝒆𝒓𝑬𝒏𝒄.𝒅𝒍𝒍 library (part of Windows 10 and 11) 2️⃣ Decryption with a Private Key and Execution

🚨 Implant Encryption via the Microsoft Dump Encoding Library 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒆𝒔 ✅️ Image Load of WerEnc.dll by arbitrary Processes - Event ID 7 (Sysmon) ✅️ File Creation - Event ID 11 (Sysmon) ✅️ Network Connection - Event ID 3 (Sysmon) ✒️ ipurple.team/2026/09/21/d...

ipurple.teamDump Encoding LibraryThe Windows Error Reporting Dump Encoding Library (WerEnc.dll) is a Microsoft signed DLL that can be abused by threat actors to encrypt their implant using a trusted Microsoft cryptographic impleme…

When I started ipurple.team two years ago, my goal was to give SOC teams practical detection opportunities across some of the most modern adversarial techniques. So far, I’ve documented 25 techniques, and every article includes: ✅ SIGMA Rules ✅ Sysmon Configs ✅ Threat Hunting Queries

If you’re hunting for malicious .tt files (msbuild), follow the approach below to detect: ✅ 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: msbuild.exe ✅ 𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐮𝐥𝐞 𝐋𝐨𝐚𝐝𝐬: 𝑴𝒊𝒄𝒓𝒐𝒔𝒐𝒇𝒕.𝑽𝒊𝒔𝒖𝒂𝒍𝑺𝒕𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒐.𝑻𝒆𝒙𝒕𝑻𝒆𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒏𝒈*.𝒅𝒍𝒍 DLLs ✅ 𝐅𝐢𝐥𝐞 𝐂𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧: T4 and output files under 📁 𝑪:\𝑼𝒔𝒆𝒓𝒔\<𝒖𝒔𝒆𝒓>𝑨𝒑𝒑𝑫𝒂𝒕𝒂\𝑳𝒐𝒄𝒂𝒍\𝑻𝒆𝒎𝒑\ ipurple.team/2026/08/24/t...

A quick video of how to use MSBuild.exe to target a .csproj file that has been tampered with multiple text template files and execute code embedded in .tt files.

📢 Code Execution via Text Template Files 🎙️ T4 .tt files are intended for code and text generation. Threat actors can create or modify a .tt file to abuse legitimate developer tooling (LOLBins) to execute code in the context of a trusted process. ✒️ ipurple.team/2026/08/24/t...

ipurple.teamText TemplateText template files can contain C# or Visual Basic code that could be compiled and executed at build time. Threat actors can create or modify .tt files to execute code in the context of a trusted p…

Before AI, the path was: Technique ➡️ Blog ➡️ Community Reach ➡️ Career Growth ➡️ 💵💶 Now: Technique ➡️ Paid Course / Service ➡️ Direct Monetization 💵💶 The information still exists, it’s just no longer free. 💸💸

🚨 Code Injection via the 𝐌𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐚𝐠𝐞𝐁𝐨𝐱𝐈𝐧𝐝𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐖 API. 𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄𝒆𝒔𝒔 🔴 Shellcode is stored in allocated process memory 🔴 The 𝒍𝒑𝒔𝒛𝑰𝒄𝒐𝒏 field ➡️ points to the shellcode address 🔴 The 𝒍𝒑𝒇𝒏𝑴𝒔𝒈𝑩𝒐𝒙𝑪𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 has the same address 🟰 lpszIcon address 🔴 Help event invokes 𝒍𝒑𝒇𝒏𝑴𝒔𝒈𝑩𝒐𝒙𝑪𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒃𝒂𝒄𝒌 ➡️ Shellcode Trigger

🎙️ Threat actors with elevated permissions could register a fake AMSI provider to establish persistence. 𝑫𝒆𝒕𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝑺𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒈𝒊𝒆𝒔 ✅️ 7 - Sysmon Fake AMSI Provider DLL ✅️ 4663 - Modification of HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\AMSI\Providers Registry Key ✅️ 4688 - regsvr32 Process ✒️ ipurple.team/2026/07/13/a...

ipurple.teamAMSI ProviderThe Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) is a Microsoft control that directs PowerShell content to the installed antimalware engine or EDR to conduct a scan and identify malicious indicators. However,…

📢 QoS Policies - Restrict EDR agents Traffic from generating telemetry & Detection Strategies 𝐃𝐞𝐭𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐒𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐠𝐲 - 𝐄𝐯𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐈𝐃𝐬 ✅️️️ 5857 - CIM Provider ✅️️️ 4104 - PowerShell ScriptBlock ✅️️️ 4663 - Registry Key Modification ✅️️️ 4688 - Process Creation ✅️️️ qoswmi.dll 🖊️ ipurple.team/2026/06/17/q...

ipurple.teamQoS PoliciesIn Windows, a Quality of Service (QoS) policy is a rule that handles outbound network traffic. Specifically, it is used to cap the outbound bandwidth of a process, port, or protocol. Organizations …