Nick Ridpath

Nick Ridpath

@nickridpath.bsky.social

Research Economist at the IFS working on the public finances and education

163 followers122 following76 posts

At tomorrow’s Budget, take in the overall outlook for the public finances – beyond just one “headroom” number. We use a set of “fiscal traffic lights” to make this easier – you can see back in March these looked relatively concerning, particularly in the short run.

They provide a more nuanced picture of fiscal sustainability than a narrow focus on one or two fiscal rules. Of course, choosing colour thresholds inevitably requires some judgement, and for evaluating past forecasts the traffic lights come with the benefit of hindsight.

You can read more about the judgements we made to construct our traffic lights here – and if you scroll through to the bottom, you can see how they capture changes in the health of the public finance over the last fifteen years: ifs.org.uk/publications...

ifs.org.ukIFS fiscal traffic lights: an explainer of indicators and thresholds | Institute for Fiscal StudiesThis piece sets out a set of ‘fiscal traffic lights’ for evaluating overall fiscal sustainability.

Nick Ridpath reposted

Replying to @maxwarner.bsky.social

If you take them at face value, today’s figures imply around £9bn of efficiencies were made in 25-26. This would be very high – plans for the following 3 years aim to make £13bn of efficiencies by 28-29. And even those plans are ambitious relative to the historic average.

Today’s initial ONS data shows that the public sector borrowed £130 billion in the twelve months to September. Higher spending, including on debt interest, has pushed up borrowing above the OBR’s forecast from last March.

With interest rates and inflation expected to remain higher for longer, debt interest spending will continue to put pressure on the public finances. Inflation will also add to pressure on public service spending plans, making this the real challenge for John Healey at the Budget.

There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:

NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:

View full thread

With this much uncertainty, trying to predict headroom precisely is a mug’s game. And with such unpredictable moves from one forecast to the next, undue focus on the exact headroom number is a distraction – the health of the public finances should be considered in the round.

There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:

NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:

View full thread

This doesn’t only reflect the effects of the war in Iran. Even before then, the OBR expected earnings to grow more slowly than other forecasters. But it seems likely that inflation will push up nominal earnings at least slightly.

Different earnings forecasts give very different headroom estimates. The OBR are more likely to stick to the lower end of this range, but reasonable judgments on earnings alone could give you anything between £13bn and £38bn of headroom.

There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:

NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:

View full thread

Different reasonable judgments on the path of unemployment, migration, disability benefits and other questions could give you very different numbers. Higher inflation adds to this uncertainty, as we don’t know how it will feed through to the real economy.

The path for earnings is a key source of uncertainty. Earnings drive the forecast for income tax and National Insurance, two large sources of revenues. Comparing the OBR’s forecast in March to different forecasters shows different views of future earnings growth.

There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:

NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:

The short version is that a prediction of the precise level of headroom is a bit of a lottery. There’s so much uncertainty that there’s really no point focusing on the exact number.

We know enough to give some broad strokes: higher interest rates will push up debt interest spending, higher inflation will push up spending, but will probably push up tax revenues by more. This might add up to a small fall in headroom – but it’s so uncertain.

This chart highlights the main challenge for John Healey at this Budget. The 2027 Spending Review already looked challenging, and higher inflation will make things much harder. Include the possibility of increasing defence spending, and the sums start to really add up.

Bee Boileau@beeboileau.bsky.social

In an illustrative scenario, topping budgets up to compensate for higher inflation forecasts since March, get defence to 3% of GDP by 2030, and avoid real terms cuts outside health and defence over the next Spending Review period could mean a top up of around £35bn in 2030-31.

Nick Ridpath reposted

NEW: Should utilities such as water, energy and transport come under public control? In deciding, the government needs to confront important trade-offs. Part of the 2026 IFS Green Budget, our new explainer sets out what greater public control or ownership could look like ⬇️

Migration's not always talked about as supply-side policy, but it may be a useful way of thinking about it. We find some migration reforms since 2020 could have had (in both directions) bigger effects than many recent high-profile reforms, inc. planning, childcare and tax.

Max Warner@maxwarner.bsky.social

Migration policy changes can have big economic effects. This chart shows illustrative estimates of the effects of these 3 policies on GDP. These could have been larger than any of the high-profile ‘supply-side’ policies since 2023, inc planning reform and childcare subsidies. [5/9]

Nick Ridpath reposted

We have a new report out today taking a deep dive into how migration and its fiscal impacts feed through the OBR’s public finance forecast. A short thread on why this matters [1/9]

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

View full thread

Zooming out further, migration also has broader impacts beyond its effects on the public finances. Just as for other areas of policy, these wider impacts should also be considered when policy is made.

Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

View full thread

In the same OBR scenario of 100k extra migration per year, it estimated that maintaining public service quality could cost ~£3bn in the fifth year of the forecast, or 1/3 of the extra tax revenues. This reflects that in general, spending on working age people tends to be lower.

Migration also has longer-run fiscal impacts, which might not matter for headroom at the Budget, but could still make a big difference going forward. Most immigrants don’t stay in the UK long-term, but fiscal effects for those who do will change as they age.

Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

View full thread

At least in the short run, impacts on benefit spending are much smaller: most new immigrants are automatically ineligible for benefits for at least 5 years. This could change in the longer run as more migrants who stay become able to claim benefits if they are eligible.

The story is more complex for public service spending. It is up to the government to decide how to respond to additional pressure on public services, so at the Budget the OBR is required to keep public service spending plans unchanged in response to changes in migration.

Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

View full thread

These are rough estimates, and the composition of migrants will matter a lot too. There are likely big differences by route – with those moving to the UK to work unsurprisingly more likely to work (and so likely to pay more in tax) than those studying or seeking asylum.

Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:

NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.

The fiscal impacts of any given rise or fall in migration will depend on the characteristics of migrants, including their age and employment. This will affect tax revenues, benefit spending and public service spending.

We’d expect higher migration – if it resembled the current composition of migration – to increase tax revenues, in part because most new migrants are currently working age.

Nick Ridpath reposted

This is the most important chart for understanding how working-age benefit spending has changed over last two decades. In overall levels spending as % of GDP is lower now that it was in 2012, but the composition of that spending is very different.

Eduin Latimer@eduinlatimer.bsky.social

3. Rising spending on disability benefits and other health-related benefit spending have pushed up overall spending on benefits for working-age adults and children since the pandemic but as a share of GDP total benefit spending is still lower than it was in 2012.

Great piece from Max. One noteworthy point on both the VAT cut and today’s bus fare cap is both costs are mostly being covered by cuts to capital spending. There’s a pattern emerging of increasing shifts towards day-to-day spending (and tax cuts) as a focus

Max Warner@maxwarner.bsky.social

We have a comment in the Times today on how yesterday's VAT cut will be paid for. The money has to come from somewhere within departmental budgets, but we don't know what will be squeezed. That's different to the bus fares policy, where more specific cuts have been set out

Lots you could say about this, but one thing it matters for is the fiscal rules. With policies this size it's not a huge difference, but day-to-day spending increases combined with capital cuts move the government closer to the binding fiscal rule of a current budget balance in 29/30

There'll be lots of discussion of effect of inflation on households today. But today's ONS figures are a reminder that impact of inflation on broader public finances are also something Andy Burnham and John Healey will have to think about:

Today’s public finance figures show debt interest spending was £33 billion in the first quarter of the 2026–27 financial year, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Debt interest spending is set to remain high, leaving the new PM and Chancellor in a tight fiscal situation going forward:

View full thread

With energy supply constraints still around, this may be a story that sticks around: we may continue to see pressure on the debt interest bill - which is already very high by historical standards - over the next few months.

There'll be lots of discussion of effect of inflation on households today. But today's ONS figures are a reminder that impact of inflation on broader public finances are also something Andy Burnham and John Healey will have to think about:

Today’s public finance figures show debt interest spending was £33 billion in the first quarter of the 2026–27 financial year, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Debt interest spending is set to remain high, leaving the new PM and Chancellor in a tight fiscal situation going forward:

Government debt interest spending in the first three months of the financial year was above forecast. A portion of our debt is inflation-linked, and higher than expected inflation - due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz - has pushed up the interest we pay on that debt.

Nick Ridpath reposted

On the Defence Investment Plan top-ups: the political turmoil surrounding top-ups averaging <£4bn/year feels like a small taste of what's in store over the next decade if we want to hit the 3.5% NATO commitment - which would require (much!) more defence money

Max Warner@maxwarner.bsky.social

3. Zooming out, we've still got a long way to go if the govt still wants to get to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 - current plans only get us about a third of the way there relative to 23-24. Getting to 3.5% could cost an additional £25bn each year in today's terms relative to these plans

Could the government borrow more to fund investment in infrastructure? There's a case for borrowing for productive investment, but there isn't one simple trick to substantially increase borrowing within the current fiscal rules. A short thread:

View full thread

They could also try to borrow more within the fiscal rules: at the last forecast, the margin against the debt rule was £27bn - but we've seen in recent years what happens when you get too close to breaching the fiscal rules, so there would be reason for caution there.

What this means is that the current fiscal rules severely limit the scope for extra borrowing, including for infrastructure investment. If the government nevertheless wants to significantly increase it, it would need to look at tax increases or spending cuts elsewhere instead.

Could the government borrow more to fund investment in infrastructure? There's a case for borrowing for productive investment, but there isn't one simple trick to substantially increase borrowing within the current fiscal rules. A short thread:

View full thread

What PSNFL doesn't include is the government's physical assets - things like buildings, land, or roads or railways. What this means is that if the government borrows more to invest in these kinds of assets, it shows up as higher PSNFL, pushing against the fiscal rules.

Could the government borrow more to fund investment in infrastructure? There's a case for borrowing for productive investment, but there isn't one simple trick to substantially increase borrowing within the current fiscal rules. A short thread:

The government's current debt rule places limits on borrowing for investment: it mandates that Public Sector Net Financial Liabilities (or PSNFL) be falling as a % of GDP in the third year of the forecast - i.e. debt should be coming down by then

PSNFL includes the government's debt, but it also includes other financial assets and liabilities - think of the student loan book as a financial asset the govt holds, or local government pensions as a financial liability the govt will have to cover

Really important context from Max below: the funding gap the government might need to fill for the Defence Investment Plan is far, far below the amount that would eventually be needed to reach 3.5% of GDP on defence spending

Max Warner@maxwarner.bsky.social

Lots of discussion in recent weeks about how to fund the (much-delayed!) Defence Investment Plan. While this is important, it is only the first step in the longer-term and much larger defence spending increase this government has committed to. A short thread:

Nick Ridpath reposted

This is most striking figure from Millburn Review. They estimate that around half of the 18-24 population who are not in education, employment or training (NEET) are not claiming any benefits. This limits how effective any reforms to the benefit system can be in reducing the NEET rate.

Nick Ridpath reposted

It wasn’t the biggest story yesterday, but the NHS in England hit its intermediate target that 65% of patients should be waiting 18 weeks or less for elective care by Mar26. That’s after big recent improvements from 61.5% in Jan to 65.3% in March. So how was this achieved?🧵