Nick Ridpath
Nick Ridpath
@nickridpath.bsky.social
Research Economist at the IFS working on the public finances and education
163 followers122 following76 posts
You can read more about the judgements we made to construct our traffic lights here – and if you scroll through to the bottom, you can see how they capture changes in the health of the public finance over the last fifteen years: ifs.org.uk/publications...
Nick Ridpath reposted
In less than a week we'll be presenting our in-depth analysis of John Healey's Autumn Budget at our post-Budget event on Thursday morning. Thursday 29 October | 10:30 - 12:00 | Online 📅 Sign up to join here: ifs.org.uk/events/autum...
Nick Ridpath reposted
Replying to @maxwarner.bsky.social
If you take them at face value, today’s figures imply around £9bn of efficiencies were made in 25-26. This would be very high – plans for the following 3 years aim to make £13bn of efficiencies by 28-29. And even those plans are ambitious relative to the historic average.
We set out the challenges and choices facing the Chancellor as he heads into his first Budget in the 2026 Green Budget. You can read it all here: ifs.org.uk/collections/...
There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:
NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:
Read this year’s Green Budget if you want to know what really matters – growing spending pressures, high debt, and high debt interest spending are going to be the real challenges. See the whole collection here: ifs.org.uk/collections/...
There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:
NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:
There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:
NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:
There’s been a lot of talk before the budget about the government’s “headroom” – the amount by which it will be meeting its fiscal rules in the OBR forecast. A thread on what we do and don’t know about headroom, and why we should pay less attention to it:
NEW: The Chancellor’s fiscal ‘headroom’ could be larger than many expect, but spending pressures will be a key challenge for John Healey at the Budget. 🧵 Here are the main findings from our 2026 IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org in association with Barclays:
This chart highlights the main challenge for John Healey at this Budget. The 2027 Spending Review already looked challenging, and higher inflation will make things much harder. Include the possibility of increasing defence spending, and the sums start to really add up.
In an illustrative scenario, topping budgets up to compensate for higher inflation forecasts since March, get defence to 3% of GDP by 2030, and avoid real terms cuts outside health and defence over the next Spending Review period could mean a top up of around £35bn in 2030-31.
Nick Ridpath reposted
Migration's not always talked about as supply-side policy, but it may be a useful way of thinking about it. We find some migration reforms since 2020 could have had (in both directions) bigger effects than many recent high-profile reforms, inc. planning, childcare and tax.
Migration policy changes can have big economic effects. This chart shows illustrative estimates of the effects of these 3 policies on GDP. These could have been larger than any of the high-profile ‘supply-side’ policies since 2023, inc planning reform and childcare subsidies. [5/9]
Nick Ridpath reposted
We have a new report out today taking a deep dive into how migration and its fiscal impacts feed through the OBR’s public finance forecast. A short thread on why this matters [1/9]
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
This draws from the first of from this year’s IFS Green Budget, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and in association with Barclays. You can read the full thing here: ifs.org.uk/publications...
Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
Migration could be quite important at this year’s budget, as falling migration feeds through into the OBR’s forecast and the government’s “headroom” against its fiscal rules. Given this, a thread on how migration affects the public finances:
NEW: Migration and the public finance forecast In our first IFS Green Budget 2026 chapter, funded by @nuffieldfoundation.org and Barclays, we look at the ways migration feeds into the public finances, and how it's accounted for in the OBR public finance forecast.
Nick Ridpath reposted
This is the most important chart for understanding how working-age benefit spending has changed over last two decades. In overall levels spending as % of GDP is lower now that it was in 2012, but the composition of that spending is very different.
3. Rising spending on disability benefits and other health-related benefit spending have pushed up overall spending on benefits for working-age adults and children since the pandemic but as a share of GDP total benefit spending is still lower than it was in 2012.
Great piece from Max. One noteworthy point on both the VAT cut and today’s bus fare cap is both costs are mostly being covered by cuts to capital spending. There’s a pattern emerging of increasing shifts towards day-to-day spending (and tax cuts) as a focus
We have a comment in the Times today on how yesterday's VAT cut will be paid for. The money has to come from somewhere within departmental budgets, but we don't know what will be squeezed. That's different to the bus fares policy, where more specific cuts have been set out
There'll be lots of discussion of effect of inflation on households today. But today's ONS figures are a reminder that impact of inflation on broader public finances are also something Andy Burnham and John Healey will have to think about:
Today’s public finance figures show debt interest spending was £33 billion in the first quarter of the 2026–27 financial year, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Debt interest spending is set to remain high, leaving the new PM and Chancellor in a tight fiscal situation going forward:
There'll be lots of discussion of effect of inflation on households today. But today's ONS figures are a reminder that impact of inflation on broader public finances are also something Andy Burnham and John Healey will have to think about:
Today’s public finance figures show debt interest spending was £33 billion in the first quarter of the 2026–27 financial year, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Debt interest spending is set to remain high, leaving the new PM and Chancellor in a tight fiscal situation going forward:
Nick Ridpath reposted
On the Defence Investment Plan top-ups: the political turmoil surrounding top-ups averaging <£4bn/year feels like a small taste of what's in store over the next decade if we want to hit the 3.5% NATO commitment - which would require (much!) more defence money
3. Zooming out, we've still got a long way to go if the govt still wants to get to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 - current plans only get us about a third of the way there relative to 23-24. Getting to 3.5% could cost an additional £25bn each year in today's terms relative to these plans
Another measure, Public Sector Net Worth (PSNW), also includes these physical assets. It is an interesting measure, but targeting it in a fiscal rule would be ill-advised, as my former colleague @benzaranko.bsky.social wrote about a few years ago: ifs.org.uk/publications...
Really important context from Max below: the funding gap the government might need to fill for the Defence Investment Plan is far, far below the amount that would eventually be needed to reach 3.5% of GDP on defence spending
Lots of discussion in recent weeks about how to fund the (much-delayed!) Defence Investment Plan. While this is important, it is only the first step in the longer-term and much larger defence spending increase this government has committed to. A short thread:
Nick Ridpath reposted
Nick Ridpath reposted