Sam Greene

Once more: The incoherence of the Trump administration should not be confused with incapacity. Trump inherited structures of incomparable global power and is unencumbered by calculations of consequence. This power may dissipate, but the costs in the interim will be immense.

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

The Trump-led process is predicated on the notion that security can be had without accountability. That may be true for America across the ocean, so that is doubtful. If Europeans are to own their own security, however, they will have to draw their own conclusions. /10

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

Europe and Ukraine will also need to decide what genuine security looks like. They will not trust assurances from Moscow, and they may be learning that they can’t trust assurances from Washington either. /8

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

There is no inherent reason why a cease-fire cannot be reached in Ukraine, and Trump may be even deserves some credit for creating a process that brings that forward. But if Europe wants a cease-fire that delivers genuine security, it may have to run the process from here. /6

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

Trump has once again shown himself to be malleable, putting some kind of security guarantees, and even a return to discussion of a cease-fire back on the table. Who knows what will happen when he gets off the phone with Putin later today. /4

For six months now, European leaders have confused Trump‘s malleability for an opportunity. What it really means is that US policy is not the foundation on which European and Ukrainian security can be built. A quick thread /1

First things first: if we’ve learned anything thus far, it’s that we should give it 12-18 hours before drawing conclusions about anything involving Trump and Putin. Not that that will stop anybody. Thus, my way too early take is that … I’m nervous. /2

As things stand, Ukraine and Europe are on the verge of being confronted with exactly the kind of Faustian deal they feared would emerge back in February. The fact that Europe hasn’t moved to block such a deal in the past six months is a failure of leadership and diplomacy. /1

Ukraine is thus caught between two fatal delusions. The first is America’s delusion that Russia will provide security for Ukraine. It can’t and won’t. The second is Europe’s delusion that its security must run through America. Not anymore. /3

As things stand, Ukraine and Europe are on the verge of being confronted with exactly the kind of Faustian deal they feared would emerge back in February. The fact that Europe hasn’t moved to block such a deal in the past six months is a failure of leadership and diplomacy. /1

Ugh. Personality traits are set in very early childhood and don’t change much over time. Asking people to become “more conscientious” in the way the science understands it is like asking me to stop being bald. Any attempt would be entirely artificial. on.ft.com/46Najk8

Measuring *actual* personality traits requires laboratory or extended observational research. Surveys can approximate (as my own do), but they’re too a flimsy peg on which to hang an argument like this.

Ugh. Personality traits are set in very early childhood and don’t change much over time. Asking people to become “more conscientious” in the way the science understands it is like asking me to stop being bald. Any attempt would be entirely artificial. on.ft.com/46Najk8

So, this is making the rounds and really -- desparately -- needs to be clarified. The TL;DR is this: Polls don't measure shifts in opinion so much as shifts in context. news.gallup.com/poll/693203/... (A brief 🧵) /1

But to suggest that these data reflect a "collapse" in Ukrainian morale would be a misinterpretation built on a basic misunderstanding of what polls actually measure: not deeply held convictions, but situational answers to over-simplified questions in an awkward context. /7

So, this is making the rounds and really -- desparately -- needs to be clarified. The TL;DR is this: Polls don't measure shifts in opinion so much as shifts in context. news.gallup.com/poll/693203/... (A brief 🧵) /1

To put it another way, question isn't really about whether Ukrainians want to negotiate or fight. It's about whether Ukrainians think a deal is possible. In 2023, for good reasons, they didn't. In 2025, for equally good reasons, they do. /5

So, this is making the rounds and really -- desparately -- needs to be clarified. The TL;DR is this: Polls don't measure shifts in opinion so much as shifts in context. news.gallup.com/poll/693203/... (A brief 🧵) /1

In 2023, Ukraine's summer offensive had failed, and Russia was again confident of victory. Moscow wasn't interested in a ceasefire The only negotiated settlement available was capitulation. In 2025, things are different -- and the data reflect that difference. /3

So, this is making the rounds and really -- desparately -- needs to be clarified. The TL;DR is this: Polls don't measure shifts in opinion so much as shifts in context. news.gallup.com/poll/693203/... (A brief 🧵) /1