William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738)

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738)

@yossarian.net

skeeting in accordance with the universal law. yossarian.net / blog.yossarian.net

472 followers66 following187 posts

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

The macOS built-in curl, git, pip, python3, perl, ruby, and openssl all read /etc/ssl/cert.pem, which still has the emSign root, but they don't check revocation like Apple's Secure Transport libraries. This is, uh, a problem. git and pip especially. I added a short-term workaround to this page.

emudhra.we-have-a-problem.comeMudhra Intermediate CA CompromiseeMudhra Intermediate CA Compromise
Filippo Valsorda@filippo.abyssdomain.expert

🚨 Six WebPKI Intermediate CAs are compromised. This is bigger than Heartbleed, but a client-side issue. Anything that verifies certificates against public roots, like most TLS clients, is/was affected. Details, live test, patched versions and workarounds at emudhra.we-have-a-problem.com Act now.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

After 10 years, I disabled my lobste.rs account. I think it's clear I am not a culture fit anymore with whatever it is they have going on there. I feel more and more like I don't belong in almost any tech community because I believe LLM agents are real, passkeys are good, and fascism is bad.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

Trusted publishing is good, but it's still just an authn method and doesn't mean the package itself is safe to run. Good breakdown by @yossarian.net about that

blog.yossarian.netYou shouldn't trust Trusted Publishing
Feross@feross.bsky.social

🚨 Another npm worm is live right now. It landed the same week npm turned on publish-time malware scanning, and after npm killed long-lived tokens in favor of OIDC trusted publishing. It propagates through trusted publishing. keyv@6.0.0 even shipped with passing provenance.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

It's not my usual beat, but I wrote a pure-Python ML-DSA verifier. pip install mldsa It's 350 lines, CC0/0BSD, single-file, no dependencies, and thoroughly tested. Signature verification handles no secrets, so it doesn't need to be constant-time.

words.filippo.ioProduction ML-DSA Verification in 350 Lines of PythonI am publishing a production, pure-Python ML-DSA verifier. It's just 350 lines, and pretty readable and robust.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

If you use GitHub Actions to publish to #PyPI, I wrote a blog post outlining what I consider the key things you can do to secure your publishing workflow. snarky.ca/how-to-publi... If you don't use GitHub Actions for publishing, this post will NOT be of interest to you.

snarky.caHow to publish to PyPI using GitHub Actions securelyThere have been several security incidents lately that involved compromising GitHub Actions workflows. This has led some to say "GitHub Actions is the weakest link" in publishing and to GitHub publish...

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

have you seen the new supply chain vuln? don't update tubu. it's literally on heebee. they got poodee's deps. they infiltrated dippy. roll back weeno. disable scripts in ~/.gumpyrc. it's in poob. do not install poob. do not update poob. uninstall poob right now. poob has it in for you.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

At the gpg.fail talk and omg #39c3 You can just put a \0 in the Hash: header and then newlines and inject text in a cleartext message. Won’t even blame PGP here. C is unsafe at any speed. gpg has not fixed it yet.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

I've been SHA-1 pinning ever since I started using GitHub Actions, but I didn't think of transitive (compound) actions, which can use unpinned sub-actions. This is fine 🔥🐶☕🔥 Time to setup zizmor.sh by @yossarian.net for automated scanning, I've had it in my "tools to try" list for a bit.

nesbitt.ioGitHub Actions Has a Package Manager, and It Might Be the WorstGitHub Actions has a package manager that ignores decades of supply chain security best practices: no lockfile, no integrity verification, no transitive pinning

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

Replying to @acyphus.lol

I'm a big fan of zizmor.sh by @yossarian.net to provide static analysis of GitHub Actions workflows as I'm working on them. The remediation advice is also top notch, for `pull_request_target` as an example: docs.zizmor.sh/audits/#dang...

zizmor.shzizmor - Static Analysis for GitHub ActionsFind and fix potential vulnerabilities in your GitHub workflows and action definitions with zizmor's powerful static analysis.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted

There's a nasty #OpenSource #SupplyChain worm going around named Shai-Hulud. It's also capable of exposing some projects' long-lived PyPI API Tokens. Read more on what's happening, and what you can do to protect your projects. TL,DR: Adopt Trusted Publishing 🔐🚀📦 blog.pypi.org/posts/2025-1...

blog.pypi.orgPyPI and Shai-Hulud: Staying Secure Amid Emerging Threats - The Python Package Index BlogShai-Hulud is a great worm, not yet a snake. Attack on npm ecosystem may have implications for PyPI.

William Woodruff (1.3.6.1.4.1.55738) reposted