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Everyone is impatiently awaiting Donald Trump’s announcement of a “major statement” on Russia, expected within hours. In Russia, three main schools of thought can be observed regarding how to interpret the apparent shift in Trump’s policy. 🧶

Among the anticipated developments are new sanctions, the seizure of frozen Russian assets, the delivery of weapons to Ukraine, and a possible agreement with European countries to fund these purchases. Despite their differences, all three schools agree that none of these developments will...

alter Putin’s strategy of coercing Kyiv into capitulation by any available means. The first school argues that, regardless of current tensions, Trump remains a friend of Russia, and that efforts to persuade him of the necessity of normalisation between great powers should continue.

Kirill Dmitriev exemplifies this view. Despite the evident fact that Trump is increasingly exasperated with Putin’s conduct, Dmitriev continues to advocate for the usual rhetoric of mutually beneficial cooperation.

The second school regards the current developments as a temporary, tactical, and ultimately reversible deviation in Trump’s behaviour—consistent with his typical conflict-management style, which involves pressuring adversaries to yield.

According to this interpretation, Trump is not undergoing a “Bidenisation” of his policy, nor is Washington reverting to the doctrine of seeking Russia’s “strategic defeat”. Rather, it is viewed as a manoeuvre designed to increase pressure on Putin and test whether this approach yields results.

Once it becomes evident that such pressure is ineffective—expected to be soon—Trump is likely to revert to a diplomatic course, including exerting pressure on Ukraine to reach a compromise. This school of thought, prominent among Russian foreign policy analysts, downplays the significance...

of the current shift, viewing it as transient. The third school, represented by figures such as Margarita Simonyan, adopts a more hawkish stance. It openly warns that this trajectory may lead to nuclear conflict. Concerning Putin, all three perspectives...

align with his position simultaneously—paradoxical as that may seem. He will continue to keep the door open for Trump to return to a path of “normalisation”, regardless of the current deterioration in relations. He will persist in the hope that Trump’s present hostility will subside,...

giving way to a more pragmatic approach that includes applying pressure on Ukraine to make concessions. Simultaneously, Putin remains prepared for any form of escalation, including nuclear, should Western military assistance threaten to undermine Russia’s strategic advantage.

It is not a question of whether such a deal was ever genuinely possible (in my view, it was not), but rather a matter of prevailing sentiment—a belief that there was a moment of opportunity, ultimately squandered due to Putin’s obstinacy and irrationality.