Ostrich

transitioning to the slightly more familiar relationship between normative and metaethics, Schroeder's 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics' (philpapers.org/rec/SCHNEA-5) has the character of a handbook chapter but makes some interesting promises worth recapping. The main point of the paper is the //

//promise is not fulfilled in that spirit. rather, Schroeder appeals to the fact that a eprfectly general explanation of what is good or right will always have to account for what it is to be good or right - normative theory dissolves into metaethics at a sufficiently high level of generality. //

transitioning to the slightly more familiar relationship between normative and metaethics, Schroeder's 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics' (philpapers.org/rec/SCHNEA-5) has the character of a handbook chapter but makes some interesting promises worth recapping. The main point of the paper is the //

//to say something is bad or good or wrong or right; it means that it is endorsed from a certain perspective. it is no more committing us to a normative stance as noncognitivism commits us to one by committing us to think that what we successfully call good, is good. end of side note.) but where//

transitioning to the slightly more familiar relationship between normative and metaethics, Schroeder's 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics' (philpapers.org/rec/SCHNEA-5) has the character of a handbook chapter but makes some interesting promises worth recapping. The main point of the paper is the //

//be refuted even by "arguments [...] as bad as [Michael] Huemer's. So far so well worn (although there is an argument in the middle that was strange to me: Schroeder says relativism is a normative doctrine because it says things like "Rape is bad if your culture thinks rape is bad," which is a //

transitioning to the slightly more familiar relationship between normative and metaethics, Schroeder's 'Normative Ethics and Metaethics' (philpapers.org/rec/SCHNEA-5) has the character of a handbook chapter but makes some interesting promises worth recapping. The main point of the paper is the //

staying on theme and with the author: 'Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?' link.springer.com/article/10.1... If science (obviously?) isn't susceptible to moral refutation, is metaphysics? it certainly sometimes is treated like it is! We might think sqampman doesn't have the kind //

why metaphysics should care about derivative (empirically informed) moral judgments like 'it is fine to kill fish' or 'it is fine to kill swamp man'; rather it is susceptible to conflict with non-derivative, a priori principles like 'conscious beings must not be killed without justification' But //

staying on theme and with the author: 'Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?' link.springer.com/article/10.1... If science (obviously?) isn't susceptible to moral refutation, is metaphysics? it certainly sometimes is treated like it is! We might think sqampman doesn't have the kind //

// be a person. The argument might not hold - i doubt that it does - but barber is right that it does not carry the same air of category error as when we argue that fish are unconscious because we know it is fine to kill fish. The reason for thjs, to Barber, is that it is possible, but not //

staying on theme and with the author: 'Is Metaphysics Immune to Moral Refutation?' link.springer.com/article/10.1... If science (obviously?) isn't susceptible to moral refutation, is metaphysics? it certainly sometimes is treated like it is! We might think sqampman doesn't have the kind //

Starting with Alex Barber's 'Science's immunity to moral refutation' www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.... This text deals with a topic that I am at times as puzzled as is Barber has notnreceived more attention in the lit, and at times find totally trivial. Fascinating just for that. //

// perceptual or quasi-percptual sense) realist theories are in danger here. And it turns out the author agrees! Sneakily, the paper was an argument for top-down and against bottom-up realism; for a kind if realism that begins from a priori principles completely independent (bilaterally) from //

Starting with Alex Barber's 'Science's immunity to moral refutation' www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.... This text deals with a topic that I am at times as puzzled as is Barber has notnreceived more attention in the lit, and at times find totally trivial. Fascinating just for that. //

//So Barber seems to have found an interesting wound to put his finger in, but once he digs down it suddenly starts to be notnso much of a problem. because the examples he uses are things like "if you think fish are fine to eat because they arent't conscious, but then science tells you dish are //

Starting with Alex Barber's 'Science's immunity to moral refutation' www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.... This text deals with a topic that I am at times as puzzled as is Barber has notnreceived more attention in the lit, and at times find totally trivial. Fascinating just for that. //

Honestly this has always been weird to me. Giving the head of the executive unilateral pardoning power seems to have only one expectable outcome right? There aren't really two different waysthis could go.

Fp zou öovf cole

Sadly @morallawwithin.bsky.social does not really post on here but she just cooked up an absolute banger of a blog I want bluesky to witness morallawwithin.substack.com/p/against-in...