Eric Rescorla

Eric Rescorla

@rtfm.com

Newsletter: https://educatedguesswork.org/

173 followers4 following39 posts

PSA. One benefit of having an electric car is it can make parking easier. It's not uncommon to come across a parking lot which is entirely full but has open EV charging spots. More expensive than charging at home but pretty cheap on the "cost of parking" scale.

View full thread
View full thread

For reference, the Badwater 135 takes place in Death Valley in July, so we're talking about running much more than a marathon in temperatures exceeding 100 F. That's exceptionally hot, but 86 F just isn't that hot.

Again, I wouldn't sign up for a marathon if I expected it to be that hot, but it's not like it's some exceptional situation that requires shortening the race.

View full thread

I'm not saying I'd want to race in that, but running in those temperatures is well within the limits of human performance; mostly you need to slow down and hydrate a lot better. I've trained in hotter temps lots of times.

View full thread

None of this applies to marathons, which are a strictly defined distance. Nothing wrong with racing 18 miles (~30K); I've done it myself. But it's not a marathon and just giving someone a finisher medal doesn't make it one.

The finished or not question can be a bit confusing in some events like mountain races where the course is always a bit fluid and organizers might need to change or shorten the race for reasons outside their control.

Eric Rescorla reposted

📣 New from KGI: Age Assurance Online explores how age assurance systems work and their tradeoffs in accuracy, circumvention, availability, and privacy. A must-read for policymakers, service providers + users to understand the consequences of these systems: kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and...

kgi.georgetown.eduAge Assurance Online: A Technical Assessment of Current Systems and their Limitations – Knight-Georgetown Institute

Eric Rescorla reposted

Welcome to Bluesky @rtfm.com ! Folks might recognize EKR from such hits as TLS 1.3, Let's Encrypt, and being Firefox CTO. He also writes a really good blog. Y'all should all follow him.

Eric Rescorla@rtfm.com

Hello Blue Sky! Check out first post in my series on transparency systems. educatedguesswork.org/posts/transp...

View full thread

3. Site operators can then download all certificates, make sure they match the consensus, and then check for bogus certificates in their name. Mission accomplished.

View full thread

The post has more detail, but the idea behind the proof is to show that there is a path from your certificate back to the root of the true, thus demonstrating that the tree was computed over your certificate.

If all goes well, this gives you a closed loop that makes it impossible to surreptitiously issue a certificate. 1. The consensus system requires the CA to commit to all its certificates. 2. Clients verify that certificates have been committed to.

View full thread

Next, you need some mechanism whereby each element in the system can assure itself that it has the same summary as everyone else (this is actually the hard part).

Finally, when you go to the Web server, it proves that it's certificate matches the summary. What this means technically is that it gives you a Merkle inclusion proof that goes back to the root.

View full thread

The standard solution here is what's called a consensus system. Effectively, you compute a summary of all the published certificates (typically by assembling them into a Merkle hash tree).

View full thread

The challenge here is ensuring that CAs are actually publishing every certificate. If your concern is that the CA was intentionally misissuing, it might just choose not to publish the bogus certificate.

The first step is to have the client (i.e., the browser) check that the certificate was published, thus hopefully forcing the CA to publish it. But now we have to confront the definition of "publish". How do we know the CA published to everyone?

View full thread

The basic idea is to require every certificate has to be published, thus allowing sites -- or services on their behalf -- to detect (at least in principle) when a certificate has been misissued

A misissued certificate can be revoked, and, if investigation reveals improper practices, browsers might choose to distrust the CA, thus rendering all of its certificates invalid.

View full thread

The solution that the ecosystem has converged on is something called a "transparency system", and in the case of the WebPKI "certificate transparency". Instead of trying to prevent misbehavior by CAs, a transparency system tries to make it detectable.

Most real-world authentication protocols rely on some kind of trusted authentication service to attest to endpoint identities. The obvious problem here is the word "trusted"; if the authentication service misbehaves, then the whole system breaks down.

You are up to date.