Timur Kadyshev

Timur Kadyshev

@kadyshev.bsky.social

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter https://www.hamburg-armscontrol.de/en/staff/timur-kadyshev-2/ IFSH https://bsky.app/profile/ifshhamburg.bsky.social All views mine. RTs/Likes mean I found it interesting, not that I agree. Profile photo ©IFSH

104 followers148 following74 posts

Timur Kadyshev reposted

Lukas Mengelkamp
@lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social

My colleague Ulrich Kühn moderates a crucial panel at the Belfer Center on the Fall Nuclear Crisis 2022 during the Russo-Ukraine war. Joining him: Colin Kahl, Janice Stein, & Kristin Ven Bruusgaard. You can watch it online. It will take place on 22 June 2026, from 12:00 pm to 1:30 pm (EDT).

belfercenter.orgShadow of Catastrophe and the Future of Nuclear DeterrenceIn October 2022, the CIA assessed a fifty percent or greater chance that Russia could use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Apparently, the world had come closer to nuclear use than at almost any point sinc...

Timur Kadyshev reposted

Pavel Podvig
@russianforces.org

On 21 October 2025 Russia conducted "the key test" of the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile (also referred to as SSC-X-9 Skyfall). The test is reported to be successful. The missile travelled 14,000 km in a 15-hour flight (Image: Pan'kovo test site). Links follow 1/

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

To be sure, I'm not saying that Russia did not violate INF Treaty, my points are: - calculation of maximum theoretical range of a CM is not a correct way to determine its actual maximum range; 1/2 bsky.app/profile/kady...

Timur Kadyshev@kadyshev.bsky.social

BM and CM are very different beasts. Why do you think GLBM range is defind as “range,” while GLCM range need to be ”determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact."? 1/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

- therefore the question of whether 9M729 was in violation with INF Treaty or not cannot be decided by calculation of its maximum theoretical range, it’s a purely political question - until Russia or the US reveal a definitive information about it. 2/2

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

BM and CM are very different beasts. Why do you think GLBM range is defind as “range,” while GLCM range need to be ”determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact."? 1/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

I'm sorry, but the arguments in this thread make no sense. "While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability". If the negotiators had wanted the same criterion for GLBMs and GLCMs, they could have easily written it that way. 1/5

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Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Russia of course could have demonstrated something definitive out of good will. Unfortunately, what they did - the January'19 briefing - raised more questions than it answered. But then again, they have the right to protect sensitive information as much as the US, aren't they? 5/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

To advance this argument you need to state (and prove) which known Russian INF-range ALCM or SLCM the allegedly offending 9M729 actually is. 6/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

Would we be having the same discussion if the US had deployed Tomahawk CMs on a ground-mobile launcher in 2014, but claimed the range was magically below the theoretical maximum simply because it hadn’t tested them beyond 500 km? It would have been just as preposterous then as this is now. 5/5

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

BM and CM are very different beasts. Why do you think GLBM range is defind as “range,” while GLCM range need to be ”determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact."? 1/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

I'm sorry, but the arguments in this thread make no sense. "While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability". If the negotiators had wanted the same criterion for GLBMs and GLCMs, they could have easily written it that way. 1/5

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Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

By your calculation, maximum range of 9M728 is >500 km, correct? If yes, why was it not considered to be in violation? Once more, calculation of theoretical maximum range is not a definitive way to determine GLCM’s actual maximum range, see Article VII.4 of the Treaty. 3/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

So once more: we can absolutely determine who is right and wrong when it comes to the 9M729. While calculating the exact range is difficult, it is clear that Russia had explaining to do, and it simply could not or would not provide it. 4/5 bsky.app/profile/kady...

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Russia would have explaining to do if the US said exactly what, when and where was tested in violation of the Treaty. What they did say instead was what the allegedly offending missile was NOT. I understand that this was to preserve their sources, but it does not help the situation. 4/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

BM and CM are very different beasts. Why do you think GLBM range is defind as “range,” while GLCM range need to be ”determined by projecting its flight path onto the earths sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact."? 1/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

I'm sorry, but the arguments in this thread make no sense. "While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability". If the negotiators had wanted the same criterion for GLBMs and GLCMs, they could have easily written it that way. 1/5

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

For GLCM maximum range in its standard design mode can be very different from its range in the mode optimized for maximum range (as illustrated in my thread you're answering to). That’s why the treaty has "standard design mode" in the range definition. 2/6 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

For GLCMs, maximum range is much simpler to determine, as it is almost entirely a function of engine efficiency and fuel load. No intrusive testing is needed to establish this, as I, and others before me, have demonstrated. 3/5

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

On the 9M729 Controversy Under INF Treaty Rules A followup to my reply bsky.app/profile/kady... to the discussion on 9M729 (re)initiated by @frhoffmann.bsky.social Under the INF Treaty, “range capability” is defined for ballistic missiles as “the maximum range to which it has been tested,” 1/6 ‬

Timur Kadyshev@kadyshev.bsky.social

Interesting post by ‪@frhoffmann.bsky.social‬ My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

The 9M729 controversy is not about its theoretical maximum range (which, if not corresponding to its standard design mode, would be irrelevant), but about US allegations that it was tested to more than 500 km from a mobile launcher. There is no verifiable open-source evidence to confirm this and 5/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

the question boils down to whether one believes the Russian or US account. Ultimately, whether 9M729 violated the INF Treaty cannot be determined by calculating its theoretical maximum range. At present it's a political judgment, not a technical one, though additional evidence could change that. 6/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

On the 9M729 Controversy Under INF Treaty Rules A followup to my reply bsky.app/profile/kady... to the discussion on 9M729 (re)initiated by @frhoffmann.bsky.social Under the INF Treaty, “range capability” is defined for ballistic missiles as “the maximum range to which it has been tested,” 1/6 ‬

Timur Kadyshev@kadyshev.bsky.social

Interesting post by ‪@frhoffmann.bsky.social‬ My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...

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Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

For GLBMs, a missile tested to less than 500 km could theoretically fly farther, and one tested above 5,500 km could fly shorter ranges. The same applies to GLCMs: a missile designed and tested for under 500 km in its standard design mode could, in a different mode, fly farther. 3/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

The decisive point is not the theoretical maximum range, but whether the missile was tested to the range in question or not. In the case of the 9M728, which could theoretically be flown much further than 500 km, no range-related issue arose because it was never tested beyond that threshold. 4/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

On the 9M729 Controversy Under INF Treaty Rules A followup to my reply bsky.app/profile/kady... to the discussion on 9M729 (re)initiated by @frhoffmann.bsky.social Under the INF Treaty, “range capability” is defined for ballistic missiles as “the maximum range to which it has been tested,” 1/6 ‬

Timur Kadyshev@kadyshev.bsky.social

Interesting post by ‪@frhoffmann.bsky.social‬ My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

and for cruise missiles as “the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion.” While the wording differs, in both cases the underlying criterion is the missile’s tested capability. 2/6

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Interesting post by ‪@frhoffmann.bsky.social‬ My own ball-park calculations on the subject: let's take Tomahawk 1,600 km range-optimized version and try to estimate its range at very low altitude for the duration of the flight. 1/3 bsky.app/profile/frho...

Fabian Hoffmann, PhD@frhoffmann.bsky.social

Hi all, I published my latest newsletter earlier, where I provide a technical analysis of the 9M729 to show that even without access to classified information it's clear that Russia has been lying. Access the post via this link: missilematters.substack.com/p/the-morat... Short summary below. 1/7

missilematters.substack.comThe Moratorium That Was None – Russia's Final INF-Range Missile ScamA technical analysis of the 9M729’s range easily dispels Russian propaganda
Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

For the original flight profile, using Breguet equation, and assuming cruise speed 900 km/h, sfc=0.72 kg/(kgf*h) initial mass 1315 kg (2900 lb) and fuel mass 500 kg, effective L/D is 2.68. Now, for very low altitude flight effective L/D can be below 2 (let's take 1.5). 2/3

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Combining that with less efficient engine (sfc=0.92) and smaller fuel fraction (fuel mass 400 kg), the range is ~530 km. Terminal maneuvering can cut it further down to below 500 km. Cruise missile's maximum theoretical range can be far from actual range for a specifically optimized flight profile.

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Interviewed by CNN (via ‪@gianlucamezzo.bsky.social‬ and ‪@tqiblawi.bsky.social‬) on the tech side of the Israel–Iran conflict for this report: edition.cnn.com/2025/07/28/m...

edition.cnn.comUS used up about a quarter of its high-end missile interceptors during Israel-Iran war, exposing gap in supplies | CNNThe United States blew through about a quarter of its supply of high-end THAAD missile interceptors during Israel’s 12-day war with Iran in June, according to two sources familiar with the operation, ...
Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

Join IFSH! We are seeking a Senior Researcher with broad expertise in dual-use technologies and their impact on deterrence, defense, and arms control policies. The position will not focus on cyber topics. ifsh.de/en/institute...

ifsh.deIFSH: A Senior Researcher (full-time) for the “Research and Transfer Project Arms Control and Emerging Technologies – Phase II”The IFSH is an interdisciplinary foundation and research institution at the University of Hamburg, which is institutionally supported by the Free and…

Timur Kadyshev reposted

Hanna Notte
@hannanotte.bsky.social

How does #Russia look at the #Israel-#Iran war? How is Russia reacting; how will it position itself; what are its cards; what are its concerns - and what are the implications for its war against #Ukraine? A🧵on 6 themes

Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

The article overlooks a key point: the risk of instability stems from Russia’s use of strategic nuclear weapons systems for conventional attacks. It is unrealistic to use strategic assets and expect them not to become legitimate targets. thebulletin.org/2025/06/ukra...

thebulletin.orgUkrainian attack on Russian bombers shows how cheap drones could upset global securityOn Wednesday, President Putin reportedly vowed to respond to Ukraine's surprise attack on its strategic bombers. According to Russia's nuclear doctrine, the attack could technically prompt a nuclear r...

Timur Kadyshev reposted

Matej Rafael Risko
@matejrisko.bsky.social

I just read it. Very solid stuff on Arrow 3 and footprints by @kadyshev.bsky.social and @ohnemax.bsky.social, give it a read.

Lukas Mengelkamp@lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social

New article by my colleagues @ohnemax.bsky.social and @kadyshev.bsky.social on the utility of Arrow 3 against Russian ICBM, IRBM, MRBM and SRBM. www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8AV5B...

tandfonline.comAnalyzing the Utility of Arrow 3 for European Missile Defense Using Footprint CalculationsAfter the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, missile defense systems became more prominent and sought after on a global scale. In 2023, Germany decided to purchase the Israeli Arrow ...

Timur Kadyshev reposted

John Ridge 🇺🇸🇺🇦🇹🇼
@johnridge.bsky.social

Nice work here from @ohnemax.bsky.social and @kadyshev.bsky.social on Germany’s Arrow 3 acquisition. Illustrates the importance of fully integrating Arrow with allied C4ISR and ultimately PWSA to extract full capability from the platform.

Lukas Mengelkamp@lukasmengelkamp.bsky.social

New article by my colleagues @ohnemax.bsky.social and @kadyshev.bsky.social on the utility of Arrow 3 against Russian ICBM, IRBM, MRBM and SRBM. www.tandfonline.com/eprint/8AV5B...

tandfonline.comAnalyzing the Utility of Arrow 3 for European Missile Defense Using Footprint CalculationsAfter the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, missile defense systems became more prominent and sought after on a global scale. In 2023, Germany decided to purchase the Israeli Arrow ...
Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

The article is in open access now.

Timur Kadyshev@kadyshev.bsky.social

In a new article in Defence & Peace Economics Igor Moric of SGS Princeton and myself attempt to estimate the cost-exchange ratio for U.S. ballistic missile defense against a major scale nuclear attack: www.tandfonline.com/eprint/NJZVR... (free access link)

tandfonline.comForecasting Costs of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Against a Major Nuclear StrikeHow many dollars would the United States need to spend on its ballistic missile defense (BMD) for each dollar the attacker spends to launch land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ar...
Timur Kadyshev
@kadyshev.bsky.social

In a new article in Defence & Peace Economics Igor Moric of SGS Princeton and myself attempt to estimate the cost-exchange ratio for U.S. ballistic missile defense against a major scale nuclear attack: www.tandfonline.com/eprint/NJZVR... (free access link)

tandfonline.comForecasting Costs of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Against a Major Nuclear StrikeHow many dollars would the United States need to spend on its ballistic missile defense (BMD) for each dollar the attacker spends to launch land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) ar...

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