Fabian Hoffmann, PhD

🚀 On 22 October, Denmark became the first confirmed European customer for Covenant’s Anthem low-cost cruise missile, ordered alongside KONGSBERG's Joint Strike Missile. missilematters.substack.com/p/european-...

Two days earlier, Destinus and Helsing announced a commercial partnership that includes a new deep-strike capability called Maelstrom, while Germany’s selection of a low-cost cruise missile with a range of around 1,500 kilometers appears to be at an advanced stage.

🚀 Yesterday, I published my latest Missile Matters post on U.S. space-based ballistic missile early warning and what the recent missing warnings in Ukraine reveal. missilematters.substack.com/p/did-the-un...

Still, a deliberate decision to curtail warnings cannot be ruled out, and unfortunately for Ukraine, Europe offers no near-term substitute. The Franco-German JEWEL program, arguably the most direct alternative, will not reach initial operational capability before the early to mid-2030s.

🚀 Yesterday, I published my latest Missile Matters post on U.S. space-based ballistic missile early warning and what the recent missing warnings in Ukraine reveal. missilematters.substack.com/p/did-the-un...

🚀 A year ago, I wrote about the lack of scalable mini jet engine production in Europe and the wider West. Demand has since accelerated faster than anticipated, driven by low-cost cruise missile procurement and the need for jet-powered interceptors. missilematters.substack.com/p/powering-s...

🚀 Germany has reportedly set aside almost €3.4 billion for Tomahawk cruise missiles and Typhon batteries in its 2027 budget planning, following an acquisition process that stalled for the better part of a year. missilematters.substack.com/p/germanys-t...

Three years after Berlin first identified a ground-launched deep-strike capability gap, the sale now appears likely to proceed, with President Trump's backing secured at the NATO Summit in Ankara and a letter of intent signed.

🚀 With Russian ballistic missile production rising and far outpacing Europe's ability to supply interceptors, Ukraine has little choice but to try to interdict Russian ballistic missiles before they are launched. But can it do so? missilematters.substack.com/p/can-ukrain...

Strikes on Russia's ballistic missile industry have scored painful hits, yet output keeps growing. The alternative is to hunt Russia's mobile missile launchers in the field, one of the hardest tasks in modern warfare, above all with stand-off weapons.

Since early 2026, Russia has fielded a family of low-cost, turbojet-powered cruise missiles and dramatically scaled up production. Russia is now launching hundreds of low-cost cruise missiles each month, soon likely thousands. 1/3 missilematters.substack.com/p/cheap-fast...

In some raids, they already account for half or more of incoming projectiles. These missiles exploit a gap in Ukraine's layered air defense that neither interceptor drones nor high-end surface-to-air missiles can close cost-effectively. 2/3

I had the pleasure of sitting down for a long interview with the German newspaper Handelsblatt on ballistic missile defense challenges in Ukraine, Europe, and the Middle East. One thing I was glad was raised is the issue of doctrine. 1/4 www.handelsblatt.com/politik/inte...

1) What exactly do we want to deploy these systems for? Right now, it seems to me that we procure, in part, for procurement's sake. But what exactly are the deterrence and warfighting objectives we want to achieve? We need to answer that question for ourselves and signal it to our adversary. 3/4

I had the pleasure of sitting down for a long interview with the German newspaper Handelsblatt on ballistic missile defense challenges in Ukraine, Europe, and the Middle East. One thing I was glad was raised is the issue of doctrine. 1/4 www.handelsblatt.com/politik/inte...

🚀 Why spend 22.9 billion USD on 7,000+ Tomahawks when low-cost alternatives are available en masse? My latest Missile Matters post takes this question apart. Full analysis available here: missilematters.substack.com/p/high-low-m... 1/3

Modern long-range and deep-strike arsenals now span three tiers: multi-million-dollar systems like JASSM-ER and Dark Eagle, low-cost cruise missiles at 150,000 to 500,000 USD, and long-range drones from 30,000 USD. Each buys something different. The question is what, and for whom. 2/3

🚀 New Mildly Alarmed episode out. @alanderminna.bsky.social and I discuss one of the key topics of my recently defended PhD: How does the proliferation of long-range strike weapons to small and medium-sized states affect strategic stability? 1/3 www.youtube.com/watch?v=sRLD...

... and why Russia, which before 2022 faced a Europe with empty arsenals and a moribund missile industry, has brought about precisely the threat environment it arguably sought to avoid. 3/3

🚀 New Mildly Alarmed episode out. @alanderminna.bsky.social and I discuss one of the key topics of my recently defended PhD: How does the proliferation of long-range strike weapons to small and medium-sized states affect strategic stability? 1/3 www.youtube.com/watch?v=sRLD...

🚀 Ukraine's deep-strike production capacity is quoted at up to 25 billion USD for 2026. How much of it can foreign buyers access? Link: missilematters.substack.com/p/exporting-... 1/3

But export viability differs sharply by category, hinging on three factors: surplus capacity, competitive positioning in the global export market, and legal constraints, which weigh more heavily on some segments than others. 3/4

🚀 Ukraine's deep-strike production capacity is quoted at up to 25 billion USD for 2026. How much of it can foreign buyers access? Link: missilematters.substack.com/p/exporting-... 1/3