Great to see this out!
@jaclarner.bsky.social@danielwincott.bsky.social and I found that national identity responds to referendums.
The effect was temporary after the Scottish referendum, but post-Brexit the identity gap between Remain and Leave voters has grown considerably over time.
🧵
Great to see this out!
@jaclarner.bsky.social@danielwincott.bsky.social and I found that national identity responds to referendums.
The effect was temporary after the Scottish referendum, but post-Brexit the identity gap between Remain and Leave voters has grown considerably over time.
🧵
So what are our implications?
Well, identity shapes political preferences, but political outcomes can reshape identity too.
Referendums may erode the identities that tie states together, specifically among losers.
And, in Britain, the Brexit realignment has extended to Britishness/Englishness.
Great to see this out!
@jaclarner.bsky.social@danielwincott.bsky.social and I found that national identity responds to referendums.
The effect was temporary after the Scottish referendum, but post-Brexit the identity gap between Remain and Leave voters has grown considerably over time.
🧵
Initially, national identity changed similarly after the EU Ref. But over time, the Remain–Leave gap in Britishness grew considerably.
This graph shows change from pre-ref (2016) to after the UK left the EU (June 2020).
In short, Remainers are now far less British than Leavers.
Remainers and Leavers haven’t simply settled into different national identities after Brexit: they’ve grown further apart.
This graph shows the gap over time in England, Scotland and Wales. The changes are concentrated in Britishness and Englishness — the identities most associated with Brexit.
Great to see this out!
@jaclarner.bsky.social@danielwincott.bsky.social and I found that national identity responds to referendums.
The effect was temporary after the Scottish referendum, but post-Brexit the identity gap between Remain and Leave voters has grown considerably over time.
🧵
The effects of referendums are concentrated among the losing side.
After the 2014 Scot Ref, Britishness fell considerably among Yes voters, but it was relatively unchanged among No voters.
However, this effect was temporary, as it had bounced back in the following survey wave.
📢 New Data 📢
We are pleased to announce the release of Wave 31 of the British Election Study Internet Panel.
You can find out more information, including where to download the data, here:
www.britishelectionstudy.com/uncategorize...
By May 2026, Labour had lost far more voters to the Greens and Lib Dems than to Reform UK, even in pro-Brexit and “marginal” areas.
Reform may be competing with Labour for seats, but they are not really competing for the same voters.
Short 🧵
📣Blog #2 📣
Even in pro-Brexit and marginal seats, Labour had lost far more support to the Greens and Lib Dems than to Reform UK by May 2026.
Read more from @jamesdgriffiths.bsky.social, Ed Fieldhouse, and Stuart Perrett here, which showcases new BESIP (W31) data:
tinyurl.com/ms3c8z8y
Labour’s losses to the Greens were not concentrated in “safe” seats where they could afford to lose votes.
Losses to the Greens and Reform were broadly similar across "safe" and "marginal" constituencies.
Losses to the Lib Dems were more common in seats where Labour had performed worse in 2024.
Labour have a new leader, so things might change now.
However, making these changes means pulling voters back from left-liberal parties, even in areas that are more socially conservative / pro-Brexit on average!
By May 2026, Labour had lost far more voters to the Greens and Lib Dems than to Reform UK, even in pro-Brexit and “marginal” areas.
Reform may be competing with Labour for seats, but they are not really competing for the same voters.
Short 🧵
📣Blog #2 📣
Even in pro-Brexit and marginal seats, Labour had lost far more support to the Greens and Lib Dems than to Reform UK by May 2026.
Read more from @jamesdgriffiths.bsky.social, Ed Fieldhouse, and Stuart Perrett here, which showcases new BESIP (W31) data:
tinyurl.com/ms3c8z8y
Labour is losing voters to the Greens and Lib Dems at similar rates in pro- and anti-Brexit constituencies.
Losses to Reform are higher in pro-Brexit seats, but remain lower than losses to the Greens (and are similar to their losses to the Lib Dems)
This is work by me, Geoffrey Evans, Zack Grant, Justin Robinson. We show The Economic Insecurity Trap. Published today by @jrf-uk.bsky.social.
Thanks to @benzaranko.bsky.social for seeing the importance of household experiences of economic insecurity.
NEW REPORT: www.jrf.org.uk/public-attit...
People report the highest levels of economic insecurity in mid-life, as they get squeezed by mortgage and childcare costs.
New research from @profjanegreen.bsky.social et al shows how insecurity can become a trap: financial setback -> less saving -> more insecure.
observer.co.uk/news/busines...
Ten years after the referendum, Brexit is still shaping British politics. By Ed Fieldhouse and @jamesdgriffiths.bsky.social.
blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandp...
The 2024 UK General Election had a bigger effect on national identity in Britain than Euro 2024
Sound surprising? Well, we found this as part of a paper accepted at @bjpols.bsky.social
With the World Cup ⚽️ starting tomorrow, this is the perfect time to read more blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
Labour lost in Wales for the first time in a century.
If you want to know more about how that happened (among other things about Welsh politics), then this today's event is for you!
Some really cool stuff here, from some excellent people, and its all online!
Ymunwch â @jaclarner.bsky.social a @richardwynjones.bsky.social ar gyfer ein dadansoddiad ôl-etholiad Senedd Cymru 2026 / Join us for our online event to examine what happened in the 2026 Welsh national election.
Dolen cofrestru yma / Registration link here 👇
www.eventbrite.com/e/1990480045...
Two weeks on from the Senedd election, here are a few reflections on what actually happened and what it might mean for the next four years. Thread. 🧵
jaclarner.github.io/jaclarner/bl...
BLOG POST: why I think the measurement of disproportionality in mixed member systems is wrong, and what to do about it www.chrishanretty.co.uk/posts/mixed_...
⏰ CALL FOR PAPERS - EPSS PRE-CONFERENCE WORKSHOP ON PLACE, POLITICS AND EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY ⏰
Submit by Weds 20 May!
For all those interested in politics of geographic divides and keen to explore impact potential of their work.
More info/submit here: shorturl.at/xS0iS@twanhuijsmans.bsky.social
🏴 New Blog 🏴
A short piece on how the new Senedd voting system worked!
How many votes did it take to win a seat? Was it proportional? Who benefitted? Where did parties win support? And what would it take to win one more seat?
If you're interested: blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
🧵👇
Ultimately this is a new voting system, and it will take voters a while to get used to it.
There is some evidence they never really understood the old one, so parties will need to really make it clear to voters.
But without reliable info (and with dodgy bar charts), this will be really tricky!
🏴 New Blog 🏴
A short piece on how the new Senedd voting system worked!
How many votes did it take to win a seat? Was it proportional? Who benefitted? Where did parties win support? And what would it take to win one more seat?
If you're interested: blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
🧵👇
The smaller parties were only able to win any representation because they had some pockets of concentrated support (Cardiff for Greens, BTN for LD).
Plaid support was spread across Wales, same with Reform (not Cardiff); that delivered consistent gains.
Thinner Lab/Con vote meant they missed out
This is important for navigating the system.
This shows how many votes a party would need to win 1 more seat in every constituency (if nothing else changes).
In some areas, within-bloc consolidation would help the bigger parties win another seat. In others, their support is already saturated.
🏴 New Blog 🏴
A short piece on how the new Senedd voting system worked!
How many votes did it take to win a seat? Was it proportional? Who benefitted? Where did parties win support? And what would it take to win one more seat?
If you're interested: blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
🧵👇
When electoral reform was introduced, the Welsh Govt said that they wanted to change to a "proportional" system.
But if we look at the Gallagher index (higher = disproportional), we can see this system wasn't really an improvement on any past Senedd election.
Its better than FPTP, but what isnt!
This happens because D'Hondt is biased towards bigger parties.
In 2021, Labour got more seats than their vote share due to their dominance in constituency ballots.
In 2026, Plaid and Reform got more seats than votes.
If you want to know why, @jaclarner.bsky.social has a great piece on this!
🏴 New Blog 🏴
A short piece on how the new Senedd voting system worked!
How many votes did it take to win a seat? Was it proportional? Who benefitted? Where did parties win support? And what would it take to win one more seat?
If you're interested: blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
🧵👇
The Senedd elects 6 members across 16 constituencies via D'Hondt.
Largest party wins the first seat. Their votes are then divided by 1+seats won, and this repeats until the 6 are filled.
On average, parties needed around 37% to win the 1st seat in a constituency, but only ~12% to win the 6th
I spent way too long this weekend correlating 81 census variables with local election results, so you don't have to.
Enjoy! datawrapper.dwcdn.net/QQQ3D/7/
Btw, please do follow @martamiori.bsky.social for the best graphs in the UK elections business (yes, I am biased…) and for the insight and all-round brilliance.
🚨NEW BLOG🚨
With polls opening in less than 24 hours, I thought it would be good to look over the kind of information environment voters would be operating in in Wales! 🏴
blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
Some wider thoughts on this research. A (not so) wee 🧵.
The UK experienced a series of high stakes events between 2014 and 2020. Thanks to @britishelectionstudy.com for asking a pre and post referendum NatID question. Without panel data on this q, we could never have known about this change. 1/n
🚨 New Research
Recently accepted at the @bjpols.bsky.social, our paper shows that Brexit led to weaker British 🇬🇧 identities among Remainers!
You can read the paper by @jaclarner.bsky.social, me, and @danielwincott.bsky.social here: tinyurl.com/mrj96ywu
Accepted at @bjpols.bsky.social: After EU Referendum Remain voters became less British🇬🇧
Same gap emerged between Yes and No voters after 🏴 IndyRef but then disappeared; Brexit's hasn't, because ongoing implementation keeps reinforcing the threat, meaning gap has continued to grow.
Full link 👇
🚨 New Research
Recently accepted at the @bjpols.bsky.social, our paper shows that Brexit led to weaker British 🇬🇧 identities among Remainers!
You can read the paper by @jaclarner.bsky.social, me, and @danielwincott.bsky.social here: tinyurl.com/mrj96ywu
Delighted this paper is coming out in the @bjpols.bsky.social
Working with @jamesdgriffiths.bsky.social and @jaclarner.bsky.social is a pleasure and privilege. (Anyone who gets the chance to work with either should grab it with both hands!) Diolch to my coauthors, the BJPS editors and our referees.
🚨 New Research
Recently accepted at the @bjpols.bsky.social, our paper shows that Brexit led to weaker British 🇬🇧 identities among Remainers!
You can read the paper by @jaclarner.bsky.social, me, and @danielwincott.bsky.social here: tinyurl.com/mrj96ywu
Comparing Remain and Leave voters, we find that Britishness has declined more among Remainers in the aftermath (2016-2020) of the 2016 EU Ref.
As British politics is still polarised around Brexit, our paper shows how political events like referendums can also reshape social identities.
So proud of all our hard work on this!
Watch until the end for a data-packed overview of the fragmented context in which these local elections are taking place – and what next week's results might mean for Labour and the Conservatives.
If I had to say what I think is the most important thing happening in British politics right now, I’d say it’s the following phenomenon, explained here:
www.youtube.com/watch?v=GvhI...
With huge thanks to @yougov.co.uk@martamiori.bsky.social and @itvnews.bsky.social
Please share! Thank you!
Interesting article. I have a somewhat different take on Wales. Welsh Labour is showing signs of exhaustion. But the defeat it faces next month is of historic significance for Labour across the UK. Not just since devolution, Labour has won every national election in Wales for a century. 1/4
Lots of misunderstanding about Wales’s new electoral system — how it works, what it takes to get elected, and especially around tactical voting. Partly to sort my own thinking, I put together something that tries to make sense of it. Proper write-up coming soon.
jaclarner.github.io/jaclarner/bl...
Newydd gan @jamesdgriffiths.bsky.social am heriau etholiadol y Blaid Lafur yng Nghymru o flaen etholiad #Senedd26 | New from Dr James Griffiths about the Labour Party's electoral challenges ahead of the Welsh Parliament election in May. #Wales#Cymrublogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
🏴 New Blog 🏴
The Senedd election is just over a week away, and the polls suggest Labour might lose in Wales for the first time in a over century!
So, I've written a quick overview on the blocs structuring Welsh politics, and what people think of Labour:
blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/thinking-wal...
Like England, Welsh politics is split into a left-liberal and right-conservative bloc. These blocs also map onto national identity and devolution, with left/Welsh and right/British.
This has helped Plaid pull so many voters from Labour, as they're a viable left and Welsh party.
The difficulty for Labour is how unhappy people are with their perfomance
This graph shows the reasons people gave why they thought Labour was doing badly in Welsh Govt.
The biggest thing is the NHS, which they control
Labour could deflect criticism in 2021 (COVID) and 2024 (Tories), but not now